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INTRODUCTION 
When and what kinds of extrinsic evidence should courts 
admit in order to interpret the meaning of a contract?  Courts 
must answer this question before they can begin the process 
of interpretation, and the answer has profound implications 
for whether courts achieve the goals of predictability and 
fairness that motivate the law of contracts.1
 
 1. See Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, 
and the Principles of Contract Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 533, 542–46 
(1998) (discussing the costs and benefits of strict and lenient rules regarding the 
admission of extrinsic evidence); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract 
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In answer to this question, courts generally follow one of 
two rules.2  Under the plain meaning rule, evidence outside 
the four corners of a contract is not admissible to interpret a 
contract that appears unambiguous on its face.3  Under the 
context rule, however, courts must consider extrinsic evidence 
to interpret the language of a contract, even where the 
contract appears facially unambiguous.4
Each of these rules is problematic, albeit in very different 
ways.  The plain meaning rule allows more sophisticated 
parties to hide behind carefully worded contracts of adhesion 
without fear that the circumstances surrounding the contract 
might intrude.
 
5  The plain meaning rule also ties the 
interpretation of contract terms to a judge’s subjective notions 
of what words mean in language and prevents parties from 
submitting evidence of alternate meanings that may be 
publically used and acknowledged, but not set forth in a 
standard dictionary.6  Furthermore, the plain meaning rule 
(or at least unsophisticated versions of it) relies upon the 
notion that words and phrases can, standing alone, have a 
single unequivocal meaning—a notion that has been 
thoroughly debunked by modern scholars who study 
language.7
While the context rule responds to the issues associated 
with interpreting language in a vacuum, it relies upon 
unreliable evidence in order to give meaning to contract 
language.
 
8
 
Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 618 (2003) 
[hereinafter Schwartz & Scott, Contract Theory]; Eyal Zamir, The Inverted 
Hierarchy of Contract Interpretation and Supplementation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 
1710, 1722–23 (1997).  See also E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §§ 7.7–7.14 
(1982). 
  Parties lie and misremember, especially 
 2. This statement is a bit of an oversimplification.  As explained below, 
there are variants of the context rule that differ in the order of preference with 
which courts treat various forms of extrinsic evidence.  There are also variants 
of the plain meaning rule that differ in the strictness with which courts limit 
themselves to the text of the contract alone.  But generally speaking, courts 
either look first to the language of the contract itself to determine whether it 
bears only a single interpretation, or instead look to extrinsic evidence to 
determine whether the contract is ambiguous in the first place. 
 3. See infra Part II. 
 4. See infra Part III. 
 5. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 6. See infra Part II.A.3. 
 7. See infra Part II.A. 
 8. See infra Part III.A.2. 
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regarding extrinsic evidence such as prior negotiations, 
course of performance, and course of dealing.  Also, extrinsic 
evidence of parties’ prior acts is often compatible with 
numerous contradictory accounts of what the parties 
intended, and thus fails to shed light on the parties’ actual 
bargain.  In many cases, it is questionable whether a court 
can determine contracting parties’ intent at all (as opposed to 
a contract’s textual meaning), even when extrinsic evidence is 
not restricted.  Most problematically, by looking to evidence of 
the parties’ subjective intent, rather than the shared and 
public meaning of terms, the context rule undermines the 
usefulness of contracts as tools to predictably constrain 
another party’s behavior.  And it is this ability to predictably 
constrain another party’s behavior that, in large part, makes 
coordinated human activity possible. 
Taking into account the criticisms levied against both the 
plain meaning rule and the context rule, this Article proposes 
a third rule for interpreting negotiated commercial contracts, 
the public meaning rule, which looks to extrinsic evidence of 
the public and conventional meaning of words and phrases in 
language, as opposed to evidence of what words meant in the 
head of the speaker.9
The epistemological basis for this rule is the fact that 
people must employ public and shared conventions regarding 
what words mean in order to communicate.  The public and 
conventional meaning of words can shed light on the 
intentions of the speaker, but the intention of the speaker 
cannot be what gives words their meaning.  This is so 
  Under the public meaning rule, the 
court applies the public conventional meaning of the words 
and phrases in the contract in order to interpret the contract, 
and then from that interpretation, resolves the parties’ 
dispute.  This rule would admit evidence of a word or phrase’s 
public and conventional meaning within language, including 
evidence outside of dictionary meaning such as trade usage, 
to interpret even what appears to be a facially unambiguous 
contract.  This rule would exclude, however, evidence that 
does not relate to what words mean publically in language, 
such as evidence of the parties’ course of performance or 
course of dealing, when interpreting an otherwise facially 
unambiguous contract. 
 
 9. See infra Part IV.  
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because, in order for people to communicate, both the speaker 
and the hearer must reflexively apply the same public and 
shared conventions for using words.10
In this Article, I argue that courts should abandon 
extrinsic evidence typically associated with the subjective 
intent of the parties, such as evidence of the parties’ course of 
performance or course of dealing, as a basis for interpreting 
negotiated commercial contracts, unless the contract is 
intractably ambiguous.
 
11  Courts have increasingly seen this 
notion of the intent of the parties as a basis for interpreting 
contracts as problematic.  As early as the nineteenth century, 
legal scholars and jurists began moving away from the 
concept of a subjective meeting of the minds towards the so- 
called objective theory of contract where a party’s intent is 
discerned from the objective manifestations of that intent, 
such as the party’s acts.  However, as explained below, even 
so-called objective manifestations cannot tell us what the 
parties to a contract subjectively intended.  A given set of 
objective manifestations is often compatible with numerous 
contradictory accounts of what a party actually intended.12
Paradoxically, the courts’ search for the intent of the 
parties ends up leading courts away from the function that 
parties intend their contracts to perform, that is, to mutually 
constrain each other’s behavior in a way that is certain and 
predictable.  When courts look to evidence of subjective 
intent, they untie contract adjudication from the public 
conventions of meaning that allows parties to set their 
agreements in writing in a way that can be predictably 
enforced.  And even though parties do not always have a 
shared intent as to those details of a contract which they 
ultimately decide to litigate, the very act of entering into a 
contract implies a shared intent that the words of the 
contract set the limits within which the process of contract 
interpretation must be carried out. 
 
Rather than looking to evidence that is commonly 
associated with the parties’ subjective intent to give meaning 
to contract language, courts should limit the application of 
such evidence to equitable claims and defenses—i.e., where 
 
 10. See infra Part IV. 
 11. See infra Part IV.  
 12. See infra Part IV.A. 
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courts are concerned about fairness, not about what a 
contract actually means.  Where courts allow extrinsic 
evidence in service of such equitable principles, it reflects not 
an attempt to determine the meaning of language in a 
contract, but quite the opposite, a willingness to sacrifice 
some certainty of meaning and predictability of effect in the 
name of fairness.  When courts apply equitable claims and 
defenses, they in effect throw out the rules that the parties 
agreed to because those rules, in their substance or in their 
application, are just too unfair.  This trade off should be made 
explicitly through equity and not under the guise of 
interpretation. 
One might argue that allowing unlimited extrinsic 
evidence in cases of equitable claims and defenses, as a 
practical matter, opens the floodgates to the same kinds of 
extrinsic evidence as the context rule, rendering the proposal 
in this Article a distinction without a difference.  But as 
argued below, different and usually tougher standards apply 
to equitable claims and defenses, and a jurisprudence that 
looks to evidence of the parties’ course of performance and 
course of dealing only when applying equitable claims and 
defenses will be different as a practical matter and not just in 
theory. 
While the rule proposed in this Article makes sense in 
the context of negotiated commercial contracts, it could lead 
to abuses outside of this context.  This proposed rule could 
have very negative consequences if applied to consumer 
contracts, especially contracts of adhesion, where evidence of 
public and conventional meaning is less relevant and where 
the terms are set by commercial entities that enjoy a position 
of superior power and sophistication. 
In the context of negotiated commercial contracts, 
however, restricting parties to evidence of usage will protect 
contracting parties from the uncertainties of extrinsic 
evidence associated with subjective intent and the legal 
gamesmanship it engenders.  And it will still allow parties to 
supplement judges’ preconceptions regarding what words 
mean with evidence that is harder to fabricate or game for 
purposes of litigation. 
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Part I of this Article describes the current state of the 
law regarding the admission of extrinsic evidence.13  Part II 
describes the plain meaning rule, the primary motivations 
behind it, and various criticisms that can be made against 
it.14  Part III describes the context rule, which has more 
recently been adopted in several jurisdictions, and argues 
that it is problematic in its own way, especially when applied 
to negotiated commercial contracts.15
Drawing upon the criticisms levied against both the plain 
meaning rule and the context rule, Part IV proposes a new 
rule for interpreting negotiated commercial contracts that 
abandons the subjective intent of the parties as the 
touchstone for contract interpretation.  Part IV proposes that, 
for negotiated commercial contracts, courts should determine 
the meaning of contract terms by looking to the public, 
shared, and conventional meaning of those terms (and as 
explained below, limited biographical information regarding 
the parties, if necessary, to decide between multiple public 
meanings).
  Specifically, the 
contextualist endeavor of discerning the parties’ intent 
through extrinsic evidence is problematic (e.g., through 
evidence of course of dealing, course of performance, or 
testimony from the parties themselves regarding what they 
meant). 
16
Part IV goes on to argue that the rule proposed in this 
Article better reflects and supports the reason why parties 
enter into contracts, that is, to predictably constrain another 
party’s future behavior.
  If a court cannot resolve the meaning of the 
contract through evidence of what the contract’s words and 
phrases mean in language and limited biographical evidence, 
then the contract is ambiguous and courts should resort to 
extrinsic evidence of the facts and circumstances surrounding 
the parties’ contract, not to interpret the contract, but to 
apply equitable principles. 
17
 
 13. See infra Part I. 
  Part IV also argues that equitable 
claims and defenses, which were created for the very purpose 
of achieving fairness, are a better mechanism for 
implementing our notions of fairness than shoehorning such 
 14. See infra Part II.  
 15. See infra Part III.  
 16. See infra Part IV.  
 17. See infra Part IV. 
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consideration into the rules for contract interpretation.  
Finally, Part IV addresses how issues of ambiguity would be 
resolved under the public meaning rule proposed in this 
Article.18
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW REGARDING EXTRINSIC 
EVIDENCE 
 
Contract interpretation is a multistage process in which, 
at each juncture, the court must decide what evidence it will 
consider.19  There is universal agreement that, at the outset, 
courts must consider the language of the contract.  The 
various jurisdictions then diverge as to what additional 
evidence courts should consider to determine whether the 
contract is ambiguous.  Where courts look to various 
categories of extrinsic evidence in this first stage, these same 
courts take different positions regarding the order of 
precedence of each type of extrinsic evidence.  Under the 
Uniform Commercial Code, for example, courts look to the 
text of the contract, along with evidence of the parties’ course 
of performance, course of dealing, and trade practice and 
usage at this initial stage, resorting to each of these 
categories of extrinsic evidence in order with the former 
trumping the latter.20
The rules regarding when and what kind of extrinsic 
evidence is admissible at the initial phase of contract 
interpretation vary greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
 
21
 
 18. See infra Part IV.D. 
  
 19. See Zamir, supra note 1, at 1710. 
 20. Id. at 1712–13.  As explained in Part IV below, this Article is not 
concerned with the order of preference courts apply to various types of extrinsic 
evidence, per se.  Rather, this Article argues that certain types of extrinsic 
evidence should not be considered at all at the initial stage where the court 
determines whether a contract is ambiguous.   See infra Part IV. 
 21. There is a good amount of confusion regarding what exactly the parol 
evidence rule is and the parol evidence rule is often conflated with the plain 
meaning rule.  Likewise, the term “parol evidence” is often conflated with the 
term “extrinsic evidence.”  The parol evidence rule prohibits parties from 
admitting extrinsic evidence of prior or contemporaneous oral agreements to 
interpret an integrated contract, while the plain meaning rule prohibits a party 
from admitting extrinsic evidence to interpret a facially unambiguous term.   
See Margaret N. Kniffin, Conflating And Confusing Contract Interpretation and 
the Parol Evidence Rule: Is the Emperor Wearing Someone Else’s Clothes?, 62 
RUTGERS L. REV. 75, 81 (2009) (quoting Sunoco, Inc. v. Makol, 372 F.3d 31, 36 
n.1 (1st Cir. 2004)).  Many of the sources referenced in this Article incorrectly 
use the terms “parol evidence” and “extrinsic evidence” synonymously.  Where 
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Certain jurisdictions continue to cleave to a strict plain 
meaning rule, refusing to admit extrinsic evidence to 
interpret a facially unambiguous contract.22  In Savik v. 
Entech, Inc., the Supreme Court of Montana held that “there 
can be no evidence of the terms of the agreement other than 
the contents of the writing except when a mistake or 
imperfection in the writing is claimed or when the validity of 
the agreement is the fact in dispute.”23
We decline to abandon the basic principal of contract law 
that we construe contract language by reference to the 
words chosen by the parties.  Especially in the context of 
commercial contracts, we assume that definite contract 
language is the best indication of the result anticipated by 
the parties in their contractual arrangements.
  Likewise, in 
Tallmadge Bros., Inc. v. Iroquois Gas Transmission System, 
L.P., the Supreme Court of Connecticut declared: 
24
Other jurisdictions, however, have abandoned the plain 
meaning rule, holding that extrinsic evidence is admissible to 
interpret a contract regardless of any facial ambiguity.
 
25
In determining the intent of the parties the court looks to 
the written contract as well as extrinsic evidence 
regarding the parties’ intent at the time the contract was 
made.  The parties’ expectations are assessed by 
examining the language used in the contract, case law 
interpreting similar language, and relevant extrinsic 
evidence, including the subsequent conduct of the 
parties.
  The 
Supreme Court of Alaska applied such a rule in Municipality 
of Anchorage v. Gentile: 
26
 
 
 
this Article quotes such sources, the term “parol evidence rule” is being used to 
mean a rule for when extrinsic evidence is admissible to interpret the language 
of a contract. 
 22. See Peter Linzer, The Comfort of Certainty: Plain Meaning and the Parol 
Evidence Rule, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 799, 805 n.28 (2002). 
 23. Savik v. Entech, Inc, 923 P.2d 1091, 1094 (Mont. 1996). 
 24. Tallmadge Bros., Inc. v. Iroquois Gas Transmission Sys., L.P., 746 A.2d 
1277, 1289 (Conn. 2000) (emphasis added).  As discussed throughout this 
Article, stricter rules for the admission of extrinsic evidence are more 
appropriately applied to negotiated commercial contracts as opposed to 
consumer contracts of adhesion. 
 25. See, e.g., Municipality of Anchorage v. Gentile, 922 P.2d 248, 256 
(Alaska 1996). 
 26. Id.  (citations omitted). 
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These jurisdictions often apply the caveat that such 
extrinsic evidence cannot be used to vary or contradict the 
contract.27  For example, the court in Admiral Builders 
Savings & Loan Ass’n v. South River Landing, Inc., held that 
extrinsic evidence is admissible to determine whether a 
contract is ambiguous in the first instance, but that such 
extrinsic evidence cannot be used to vary, alter, or contradict 
the plain meaning of the writing.28
[I]n the initial determination of ambiguity, vel non, 
extrinsic evidence need not be excluded from the trial 
court’s consideration (so long as that evidence does not 
vary, alter, or contradict the plain meaning of the writing) 
because, until the evidence is heard, ambiguity or the lack 
thereof cannot be fully appreciated.
 
29
Still other courts apply various hybrids of the two.  For 
example in Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Business Credit, Inc.,
 
30 
the Third Circuit held that courts ought to consider extrinsic 
evidence of the facts and circumstances surrounding a 
contract before determining whether the contract is 
ambiguous,31
[O]ur approach does not authorize a trial judge to demote 
the written word to a reduced status in contract 
interpretation.  Although extrinsic evidence may be 
considered under proper circumstances, the parties 
remain bound by the appropriate objective definition of 
the words they use to express their intent.  Generally 
parties will be held to definitions given to words in 
specialized commercial and trade areas in which they 
deal.  Similarly, certain words attain binding definition as 
legal terms of art.
 but further held that there are limits on the 
range of meanings that words can bear.  As the court 
explained: 
32
 
 
 
 27. As discussed below, this idea that extrinsic evidence gives contract 
language its meaning but cannot be used to contradict the contract is 
problematic.  See infra Part III.A.3. 
 28. Admiral Builders Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. S. River Landing, Inc., 502 A.2d 
1096, 1099 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Bus. Credit, Inc., 619 F.2d 1001 (3d Cir. 
1980). 
 31. Id. at 1010–11. 
 32. Id. at 1013. 
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In Mellon Bank, the court analyzed whether the term 
“insolvent” should be interpreted according to its standard 
commercial definition, i.e., a business is insolvent where “[it 
is] unable to pay [its] debts as they come due,” or “[its] 
liabilities exceed its assets.”33  The trial court looked to 
extrinsic evidence showing that Aetna had not considered 
Mellon Bank’s assets and liabilities when the parties entered 
into their contract.34  Accordingly, (so the argument went) the 
parties had not intended the term “insolvent” to mean 
“liabilities exceeding assets.”35  The Third Circuit reversed, 
holding that the term “insolvent” was too well established to 
be contradicted by extrinsic evidence.36
Even within a particular jurisdiction, the rules regarding 
extrinsic evidence are not always uniformly applied.  As 
Professor Linzer observed in his scholarship regarding plain 
meaning and extrinsic evidence, “[o]ften lower courts stick to 
older, more rigid rules and ignore, or at least do not follow, 
liberalizing cases from their state’s supreme court.”
 
37
II. THE PLAIN MEANING RULE 
 
Courts that strictly apply the plain meaning rule 
generally follow the following procedure for interpreting a 
contract: First, the court looks to the text of the contract alone 
and determines whether the contract is ambiguous on its 
face.38  If the contract is ambiguous on its face, the court will 
admit extrinsic evidence in order to determine the contract’s 
meaning.39
 
 33. Id. at 1008. 
  Courts applying the plain meaning rule, however, 
 34. Id. at 1008–09. 
 35. Id. at 1009. 
 36. Id. at 1013-14.   
 37. Linzer, supra note 22, at 806 (citing Student Loan Guarantee Found. of 
Ark. v. Barnes, Quinn, Flake & Anderson, Inc., 806 S.W.2d 628 (Ark. Ct. App. 
1991)).  See Harry G. Prince, Contract Interpretation In California: Plain 
Meaning, Parol Evidence and Use of the “Just Result” Principle, 31 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 557, 577–78 (1998). 
 38. W.W.W. Assocs., Inc. v. Giancontieri, 566 N.E.2d 639, 642 (N.Y. 1990) 
(“[E]xtrinsic and parol evidence is not admissible to create an ambiguity in a 
written agreement which is complete and clear and unambiguous upon its 
face.”  (quoting Intercontinental Planning, Ltd. v. Daystrom, Inc., 248 N.E.2d 
576, 580 (N.Y. 1969))). 
 39. Connors v. Tanoma Mining Co., 953 F.2d 682, 685 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“A 
contract’s meaning is to be determined by its language, without resort to 
extrinsic considerations, unless the language is ambiguous.” (quoting Eatmon v. 
Bristol Steel & Iron Works, Inc., 769 F.2d 1503, 1518 (11th Cir. 1985))). 
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will allow in extrinsic evidence, regardless of any facial 
ambiguity, to establish equitable claims (such as unjust 
enrichment)40 or equitable defenses to the contract (such as 
fraud).41
Early courts adopted the plain meaning rule as a 
bulwark against faulty memory and dishonesty.
 
42  As the 
court in The Countess of Rutland’s Case declared, “it would be 
inconvenient, that matters in writing made by advice and on 
consideration, and which finally import the certain truth of 
the agreement of the parties should be controlled by 
averment of the parties to be proved by the uncertain 
testimony of slippery memory.”43
The plain meaning rule arguably grew out of pre-
nineteenth century common law conventions that privileged 
sealed instruments over all other forms of evidence of a legal 
obligation.
 
44  Under this pre-nineteenth century rule, a 
writing under seal could not be controverted or varied by 
written or oral evidence because sealed documents were 
presumed to be the best evidence of a party’s intent to be 
bound.45
 
 40. See, e.g., Midwest Indus. Funding, Div. of Rivera Lend Lease, Inc. v. 
First Nat’l Bank of Lockport, 973 F.2d 534, 539 (7th Cir. 1992) (“The parties 
should be allowed to admit extrinsic evidence relevant to the Bank’s unjust 
enrichment defense.”). 
  Other commentators have suggested that the plain 
meaning rule arose not as a natural evolution of prior 
common law notions of what was necessary to “seal a deal,” 
but instead out of a concerted effort by jurists such as 
Langdell, Williston, and Holmes, to remake the common law 
 41. See Happy Dack Trading Co. v. Agro-Industries, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 986, 
992 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (“[P]arol evidence is admissible to show that a contract is 
not a contract but a sham . . . .”).  See also Callanan v. Powers, 92 N.E. 747, 753 
(N.Y. 1910) (“It is claimed that these conversations were incompetent, because 
they were merged in the written contract, according to the familiar rule.  The 
plaintiff, however, had alleged fraud as a ground of rescission, and he had a 
right to prove the existence of fraud if he could.  On that issue the contemporary 
and preceding conversations, both those involving representations and those 
tending to show that the directors relied upon them were competent, and, 
although the plaintiff did not succeed on the issue of fraud, still the receipt of 
that evidence was not error.”) 
 42. See, e.g., The Countess of Rutland’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 89, 90 (K.B. 
1604), 5 Co. Rep. 25b. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See Joseph M. Perillo, The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract 
Formation and Interpretation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 427, 434 (2000) (citing WM. 
L. CLARK, JR., HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 262 (1894)). 
 45. Id. 
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for purposes of a grand theory of contract, which would 
accommodate free-market capitalism during the industrial 
revolution.46
Regardless of its origins, the plain meaning rule came to 
be embraced by formalists as a curative to the vagaries of the 
subjective intent of the parties.  Rather than attempt to 
divine the parties’ actual subjective intent through the 
parties’ testimony and other extrinsic evidence, courts would 
limit themselves to the plain meaning of the contract 
language itself.
 
47  As commentators from as early as 1810 
explained, “[t]o admit a party to a contract to support it by his 
own testimony in an action brought upon it, would destroy all 
security for our property . . . . ”48  As jurists from across the 
Atlantic simultaneously explained, “[i]t would, indeed, be 
highly mischievous, and tend to the endangering all property 
. . . if such parol testimony should be admitted . . . . It would 
tend greatly to introduce perjuries . . . to the great hazard of 
the titles of all property.”49
As described more recently by the high court in New 
York, the plain meaning rule brings “stability to commercial 
transactions by safeguarding against fraudulent claims, 
perjury, death of witnesses . . . infirmity of memory . . . [and] 
the fear that the jury will improperly evaluate the extrinsic 
evidence.”
 
50
 
 46. See id. at 428 (“Grant Gilmore’s account holds that Christopher 
Columbus Langdell invented the generalized notion of contract in 1871, which 
was brilliantly reformulated by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and then 
propagated by a diligent scrivener named Williston.  Gilmore credits Holmes 
with the invention of the objective theory.  Like Horwitz and Friedman, Gilmore 
attributes the creation of late nineteenth century classical contract doctrine to a 
response to the same stimuli that gave rise to laissez-faire economics.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
  As one author put it, “[t]he conceptual move that 
launched the rule seems quite natural today: the written 
agreement is not merely a memorandum that summarizes 
understandings between people.  Rather, the document 
 47. See id. at 443–44.  
 48. Id. (quoting ZEPHANIA SWIFT, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN 
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES AND A TREATISE ON BILLS OF EXCHANGE 99 (1810)). 
 49. Id. at 445 (quoting Holmes v. Simons, 20 S.C. Eq. (3 Des.) 149, 152 
(1810)). 
 50. W.W.W. Assocs., Inc. v. Giancontieri, 566 N.E.2d 639, 642 (N.Y. 1990) 
(citation omitted).  See also Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in 
Relational Contract, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 847, 848 (2000) (arguing that a “rigorous 
application of the common-law plain meaning and parol evidence rules preserve 
the value of predictable interpretation . . . .”) 
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constitutes the agreement itself.”51
Under the plain meaning rule, a court will only look 
beyond the text of the contract itself when the contract, 
standing alone, cannot be given a single clear meaning.
 
52
A. Problems with the Plain Meaning Rule 
  And 
thus the traditional plain meaning rule takes for granted that 
words and properly constructed phrases are capable of having 
a single unambiguous meaning. 
1. The Problem with Plain Meaning in Principal 
As many critics of the plain meaning rule have opined, it 
is very difficult to attribute a singular plain meaning to a 
word and it is even more difficult to do so to an entire 
contractual provision.53
A judge who believes that contract terms can have a 
single, reasonable meaning that is apparent without 
reference to extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intentions 
“retires into that lawyer’s Paradise where all words have a 
fixed, precisely ascertained meaning; where [people] may 
express their purposes, not only with accuracy, but with 
fulness [sic]; and where, if the writer has been careful, a 
lawyer . . . may sit in [a] chair, inspect the text, and 
answer all questions . . . .”  Such a belief is unrealistic, for 
“the fatal necessity of looking outside the text in order to 
identify persons and things, tends steadily to destroy such 
illusions and to reveal the essential imperfection of 
language, whether spoken or written.”
  As one critic put it: 
54
As Arthur Corbin, one of the most famous critics of the 
plain meaning rule, explained: 
 
It is true that when a judge reads the words of a contract 
he may jump to the instant and confident opinion that 
they have but one reasonable meaning and that he knows 
what it is.  A greater familiarity with dictionaries and the 
 
 51. Lawrence M. Solan, The Written Contract as Safe Harbor for Dishonest 
Conduct, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 87, 92 (2001). 
 52. See Margaret N. Kniffin, A New Trend In Contract Interpretation: The 
Search For Reality as Opposed to Virtual Reality, 74 OR. L. REV. 643, 648 (1995) 
(“The ambiguity thus required by these courts as prerequisite to admission of 
extrinsic evidence is often said to exist when the contract language is 
reasonably susceptible to at least two different meanings.”). 
 53. See, e.g., id. at 644–45 n.3. 
 54. Id. at 648 (alteration in original) (quoting JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A 
PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 428–29 (1898)). 
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usages of words, a better understanding of the 
uncertainties of language, and a comparative study of 
more cases in the field of interpretation, will make one 
beware of holding such an opinion so recklessly arrived 
at.55
These scholars make the point that a word’s meaning is 
often, if not always, unfixed, and can only be determined in 
context. 
 
2. The Plain Meaning Rule as a Cover for Exploitive 
Contracts 
A strict plain meaning rule can enable exploitive 
business practices at the contract formation stage.56  A strict 
plain meaning rule provides companies with a “safe harbor 
for sharp business practices that results from any version of 
the rule that permits businesses to promote products and 
services subject to a subsequent, integrated agreement that 
the other party did not read or understand when entering 
into a transaction.”57
Professor Solan outlines three types of contracts where a 
strict plain meaning rule allows a sophisticated commercial 
company to exploit another party’s lack of bargaining power 
and sophistication: consumer credit agreements (e.g., credit 
card agreements); shrink wrap contracts (i.e., form contracts 
shipped along with goods); and certain promissory notes.
 
58
The plain meaning rule can help sophisticated sellers of 
commercial credit abuse their superior bargaining position.
 
59  
As many of us have experienced firsthand, purveyors of 
consumer credit will often send their would-be customers 
applications for credit that clearly disclose terms which would 
make the offer enticing, while burying less favorable terms in 
blocks of “devil in the details” fine print.60
 
 55. Id. at 644–45 n.3 (quoting 3 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 
§ 535 (1960)). 
  Now certainly if 
the print is fine enough or the terms monstrously unfair, 
courts may not enforce them for equitable reasons such as 
unconscionability.  But if the terms or the manner in which 
 56. See Solan, supra note 51, at 90, 106–14. 
 57. Id. at 90. 
 58. Id. at 106–14. 
 59. See id. at 109. 
 60. See id. at 107–08. 
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they are communicated do not rise to the level of procedural 
or substantive unconscionability, credit peddlers, under a 
strict plain meaning rule, can hide behind a contract that is 
sneaky but not sneaky enough to be torn up by the court.  As 
Professor Solan explains: 
Credit card issuers can circulate such applications because 
they know that ultimately it is the written agreement that 
will govern, and the written agreement will have no such 
silly contradictions.  The parol evidence rule [in its plain 
meaning rule form] comes into this picture once the 
borrower has agreed to abide by the credit agreement by 
signing the application or by using the credit card.61
Professor Solan also points to shrink wrap contracts (also 
known as box-top contracts), which like the consumer credit 
transactions discussed above, are both consumer contracts 
and contracts of adhesion.  Shrink wrap contracts are form 
contracts that are bundled with goods when they are shipped.  
The terms of such contracts usually state something like “by 
using this product you agree to be bound by the following 
terms.”
 
62
Professor Solan also points to a particular kind of 
promissory note transaction where one company convinces 
another to sign a promissory note for outstanding amounts 
due, payable on demand, but orally promises to not execute 
for a particular period of time.
  Again, a plain meaning rule in this context makes it 
easier for companies to bind consumers to one sided terms, 
which the consumer is less likely to read or understand. 
63  The idea being that the 
debtor will readily agree to such a contract rather than face 
immediate default.  It is unclear, however, whether this type 
of dishonest conduct is one which, in fact, ends up being 
protected under the plain meaning rule.  In many 
jurisdictions, equitable doctrines outside of the plain meaning 
rule are likely to aid the signer of such a promissory note, at 
least in those cases where a strict plain meaning rule would 
seem to produce unfair results.  Under even a strict plain 
meaning rule, extrinsic evidence is admissible to prove fraud 
or other defenses which assert that no contract was formed in 
the first place.64
 
 61. Id. at 109. 
 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 112–13. 
 64. Even under a centuries-old formulation of the plain meaning rule, a 
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Notice that the first two types of contracts discussed by 
Professor Solan are both consumer contracts and contracts of 
adhesion.  As mentioned in the introduction of this Article, a 
strict plain meaning rule is far more problematic when 
applied to consumer contracts, especially contracts of 
adhesion.  Indeed, Professor Solan’s analysis is a strong 
argument for having different rules for interpreting and 
applying consumer contracts of adhesion.  As he recognizes, 
reliance on the language of the contract itself rather than 
extrinsic evidence tends to amplify power and sophistication 
disparities between parties: 
Reliance on the written word is a two-edged sword.  On 
the one hand, it reduces the likelihood of dispute about 
what the agreement (or statute) really says.  On the other, 
it empowers the party with the pen.  When only one party 
to the transaction controls the document, the possibility 
arises that the drafter will take advantage of this leverage 
unfairly.65
In negotiated commercial contracts, disparities in power, 
sophistication, and access to legal counsel are less severe.  
The very fact that a contract is negotiated rather than a 
contract of adhesion evinces a greater parity of power 
between the parties.  By comparison, consumer contracts are 
often contracts of adhesion, which do not allow the consumer 
any opportunity to negotiate contractual terms.  The 
problems associated with restricting extrinsic evidence are 
thus less pronounced in the context of negotiated commercial 
contracts—the context in which this Article suggests that a 
more restrictive rule regarding extrinsic evidence ought to be 
applied.
 
66
 
party was allowed to escape liability by showing that they entered into the 
contract by fraud or mistake.  JOHN H. WIGMORE, 9 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE: 
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2405, at 15 (James H. Chadbourn ed., 
4th ed. 1981) [hereinafter WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE] (“That a man who could not 
read had sealed a document which had been incorrectly read over to him, was 
recognized, before the 1400s, as sufficient to relieve him from liability.”); Staver 
v. Rogers, 28 P. 906, 907 (Wash. 1892) (holding that extrinsic evidence is 
inadmissible “without an allegation in the pleadings that such contract was in 
fact signed by the party making such allegations by mistake or fraud, or 
without full knowledge of the conditions thereof.”). 
 
 65. Solan, supra note 51, at 92. 
 66. As discussed below, the reason for applying a more strict rule regarding 
extrinsic evidence is not because meaning somehow arises differently in 
negotiated commercial contracts as opposed to consumer contracts of adhesion.  
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3. Plain Meaning, Ambiguity, and Reasonableness: 
Whose Plain Meaning Should Govern? 
Another problem with the plain meaning rule is that it 
ties the interpretation of contract language to the subjective 
understanding of the interpreting judge by excluding 
extrinsic evidence of the public and conventional meaning of 
language.  Under the plain meaning rule, a court must first 
determine whether a contract is ambiguous on its face.67  A 
contract is considered ambiguous if it is subject to two or 
more reasonable interpretations.68
This formulation requires a judge to determine whether 
each party’s proposed interpretation is reasonable, and to do 
so armed only with the judge’s own preconceptions regarding 
what the particular terms in question mean.  As many 
scholars have recognized in the context of tort law and 
criminal law (especially in regard to claims of self-defense), 
when a judge or jury is required to determine whether 
something is reasonable, without any further guidance, the 
judge or jury’s preconceptions regarding what is reasonable 
infect the determination.
 
69  In the context of criminal 
defendants claiming self-defense, this can lead to, for 
example, a jury’s racial biases excusing violent conduct that 
was, at least in part, motivated by racial stereotypes 
regarding the victim.70 
But reasonableness determinations can and do lead to 
problems in the commercial contract context as well.  
 
Rather, the possibility of exploitable contracts provides equitable grounds for 
allowing in a broader range of extrinsic evidence. 
The 
notion that a contract is ambiguous if it is subject to more 
than one reasonable interpretation injects a judge’s subjective 
notions of meaning into a process that purports to be 
concerned with objectivity and predictability.  If the 
 67. See W.W.W. Assocs., Inc. v. Giancontieri, 566 N.E.2d 639, 642 (N.Y. 
1990) (“[E]xtrinsic and parol evidence is not admissible to create an ambiguity 
in a written agreement which is complete and clear and unambiguous upon its 
face.” (quoting Intercontinental Planning, Ltd. v. Daystrom, Inc., 248 N.E.2d 
576, 580 (N.Y. 1969)). 
 68. See, e.g., Cent. Auto Co. v. Reichert, 273 N.W.2d 360, 364–65 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 1978) (“Words and phrases in a contract are ambiguous when they are 
reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning.”). 
 69. See, e.g., Aaron D. Goldstein, Note, Race, Reasonableness, and the Rule 
of Law, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1190 (2003). 
 70. See id. 
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preconceptions of the judge determine reasonableness, then 
the law of contracts is made unpredictable, or perhaps worse, 
made into a game where litigants intentionally play to such 
preconceptions.  This is especially problematic in contracts 
involving a highly technical subject matter, where ambiguity 
may be apparent to someone familiar with relevant trade 
usage, but not apparent to a judge who is asked to make a 
reasonableness determination, in the first instance, within 
the four corners of the contract alone. 
As the court in Metric Constructors, Inc. v. NASA 
recognized, the plain meaning rule can fail to account for the 
parties’ reasonable commercial expectations, even where the 
language of a contract appears facially unambiguous.71
In Metric Constructors, the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit (CAFC) analyzed whether evidence of trade 
practice is admissible to determine if terms within a contract 
are ambiguous.
 
72  Prior to the court’s decision in Metric 
Constructors, the CAFC had issued several conflicting 
opinions regarding when evidence of trade practice and usage 
are admissible to interpret the meaning of contract terms.73
In Metric Constructors, the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA) awarded a contract to Metric 
Constructors, Inc. to build a space station processing facility 
at the Kennedy Space Center in Florida.
 
74  A major part of 
the contract required the contractor to install “new lamps” in 
fluorescent light fixtures capable of high-intensity lighting 
“immediately prior to completion of the project.”75  The 
president of Metric’s electrical subcontractor, Meisner 
Electric, Inc., testified that he interpreted the specification to 
require “(a) the installation of new lamps in the facility and 
(b) immediately prior to the contract completion or the 
provision of beneficial occupancy of specific rooms or areas, 
the replacement of any defective, burned out, or broken 
lamps.”76
 
 
 
 71. Metric Constructors, Inc. v. NASA, 169 F.3d 747, 754 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 72. Id. at 753. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 748. 
 75. Id. at 749. 
 76. Metric Constructors, Inc. v. NASA, ASBCA No. 48,852, 98-1 BCA ¶ 
29,384, at 146,046. 
GOLDSTEIN FINAL 7/1/2013  2:07 PM 
92 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53 
After NASA inspected the facility towards the end of the 
project, it created a punch list of items the contractor had to 
address before the contract would be considered fulfilled.77  
The list included a “request to relamp the facility.”78  The 
ASBCA79 later found that in the electrical industry, the term 
“relamping” is used to describe the “total replacement of 
lamps at a particular facility,” and “[i]t is uncommon for 
specifications for new construction to require relamping.”80  
The board also found that NASA’s estimate for the cost of the 
project did not include the cost of this relamping work.81
After receiving the punch list, Metric sent NASA a letter 
requesting that NASA put off or eliminate the replacement of 
working lamps from the specifications of the contract.
 
82  The 
Contract Officer responded by deleting the contract 
requirement to install new lamps from Metric’s scope of 
work.83  After about ten months of unsuccessful price 
negotiation, the Contract Officer unilaterally reduced the 
contract price by $132,570 for the work deleted by the 
modification.84
On appeal to the ASBCA, Metric argued that the absence 
of the trade term “relamping” in the specification “reasonably 
led to the interpretation that it was required to replace only 
those lamps which did not work.”
 
85
 
 77. Id.  
  The Board refused to 
consider evidence of trade usage after it determined that the 
work described in the contract was not ambiguous: “It is 
 78. Id.  
 79. The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals is described as follows 
on the ASBCA’s website: 
The ASBCA is a neutral, independent forum which has been in 
existence for over fifty years.   Its primary function is to hear and 
decide post-award contract disputes between government contractors 
and the Department of Defense; the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration; the Central Intelligence Agency, as appropriate; and 
other entities with whom the ASBCA has entered into agreements to 
provide services. 
ARMED SERVS. BD. OF CONTRACT APPEALS, http://www.asbca.mil/ (last visited 
Sept. 30, 2012). 
 80. Metric Constructors, Inc. v. NASA, ASBCA No. 48,852, 98-1 BCA ¶ 
29,384, at 146,045. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 146,046–47. 
 83. Id. at 146,047. 
 84. See id. at 146,048. 
 85. Id. at 146,051. 
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difficult to divine a less ambiguous requirement than that for 
‘new lamps.’ ” 86  Thus, according to the ASBCA, because the 
contract language was unambiguous, Metric could not submit 
evidence of trade practice or custom to vary the unambiguous 
terms.87  The ASBCA held that “NASA was entitled to issue 
the deductive change,”88 and that the amount deducted was 
“reasonable.”89
On appeal, the CAFC stated that the case “squarely 
presents the recurring issue of the role of evidence of trade 
practice and custom in contract interpretation.”
 
90
The court identified two lines of cases that deal with the 
“role of evidence of trade practice and custom in contract 
interpretation.”
 
91  The first line of cases holds that a court 
“may consult evidence of trade practice and custom to discern 
the meaning of an ambiguous contract provision, but not to 
contradict or override an unambiguous contract provision.”92  
The second line of cases holds that a court “may consult 
evidence of trade practice and custom to show that ‘language 
which appears on its face to be perfectly clear and ambiguous 
has, in fact, a meaning different from its ordinary 
meaning.’ ” 93  The first approach to contract interpretation 
assumes that language is capable of having a plain and 
unambiguous meaning on its face, and that such meaning 
should govern the interpretation of a contract.94
Ultimately, the court adopted a standard closer to the 
second line of cases.  After accepting evidence of industry 
usage from the plaintiff, the court ruled that by failing to use 
the term “relamping” to describe the work that it sought, 
NASA had created ambiguous specifications that had to be 
construed against NASA—the party that drafted it.
 
95
 
 
 
 
 86. Metric Constructors, Inc. v. NASA, 169 F.3d 747 (Fed. Cir. 1999), 
ASBCA No. 48,852, 98-1 BCA ¶ 29,384, at 146,050 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 146,051. 
 89. Id. at 146,052.  
 90. Metric Constructors, Inc., v. NASA, 169 F.3d 747, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. (quoting Gholson, Byars & Holmes Const. Co. v. United States, 351 
F.2d 987, 999 (Ct. Cl. 1965).  
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 754. 
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As the court in Metric Constructors explained: 
Trade practice and custom illuminate the context for the 
parties’ contract negotiations and agreements.  Before an 
interpreting court can conclusively declare a contract 
ambiguous or unambiguous, it must consult the context in 
which the parties exchanged promises.  Excluding 
evidence of trade practice and custom because the contract 
terms are “unambiguous” on their face ignores the reality 
of the context in which the parties contracted.  That 
context may well reveal that the terms of the contract are 
not, and never were, clear on their face.  On the other 
hand, that context may well reveal that contract terms 
are, and have consistently been, unambiguous.96
The plaintiff in Metric Constructors also raised the point 
that refusing to consider trade usage to interpret what 
appears to be an unambiguous contract could lead to absurd 
results, especially where a contract incorporates language 
that may seem unambiguous to a person outside the relevant 
industry, but that has a very different meaning within the 
industry: 
 
Metric points out that the vast majority of lamps for this 
project (nearly 12,000 of about 13,000) had a life of six 
years and eight months.  The Board found that most of the 
lamp installation occurred during the summer of 1993.  
Metric delivered more than half of the facility in June and 
October 1993, and ultimately completed the project the 
following summer.  Based on this sequence of events, 
Metric points to the absurdity and waste of re-lamping 
recently installed, long-lived lamps. 97
Thus the plain meaning rule can lead to absurd results 
where the court is not aware of the usage of a term that is 
employed by participants within an industry to which the 
parties belong. 
 
III. THE CONTEXT RULE: A RESPONSE TO THE PLAIN MEANING 
RULE 
The context rule is the culmination of decades of criticism 
leveled against the plain meaning rule, which is grounded in 
the notion that words are capable of possessing a singular 
 
 96. Id. at 752.  
 97. Id. at 750. 
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plain meaning.98
Under the context rule, when a court decides whether a 
contract is ambiguous in the first instance, the court must 
examine the language of the contract itself along with all 
extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent.
  The impetus behind the context rule lies in 
the critiques of scholars such as Arthur Corbin discussed 
above. 
99  Typically, courts 
applying the context rule also hold that extrinsic evidence is 
not admissible to vary or contradict the language of the 
contract.100
Put simply, the context rule states that extrinsic evidence 
is always admissible to interpret even a facially unambiguous 
contract.  The Washington Supreme Court decision Berg v. 
Hudesman
 
101 is often cited as an exemplar of the context rule 
in action.  In Berg, the Supreme Court of Washington 
announced that “extrinsic evidence is admissible as to the 
entire circumstances under which the contract was made, as 
an aid in ascertaining the parties’ intent” even where a 
contract appears unambiguous on its face.102  In so holding, 
the court abandoned the plain meaning rule, which excluded 
extrinsic evidence in interpreting a fully integrated (i.e. 
complete) and unambiguous contract.103  Rather, the court 
held that “parol evidence is admissible to show the situation 
of the parties and the circumstances under which a written 
instrument was executed, for the purpose of ascertaining the 
intention of the parties and properly construing the 
writing.”104
 
 
 
 98. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 99. See Berg v. Hudesman, 801 P.2d 222, 229, (Wash. 1990) (“[E]xtrinsic 
evidence is admissible as to the entire circumstances under which the contract 
was made, as an aid in ascertaining the parties’ intent.”).  See also id. (“[P]arol 
evidence is admissible to show the situation of the parties and the 
circumstances under which a written instrument was executed, for the purpose 
of ascertaining the intention of the parties and properly construing the writing.” 
(quoting J.W. Seavey Hop Corp. v. Pollock, 147 P.2d 310, 316 (Wash. 1944)). 
 100. See In re Marriage of Schweitzer, 937 P.2d 1062, 1066 (Wash. 1997). 
 101. Berg, 801 P.2d 222. 
 102. Id. at 229. 
 103. Id. at 230. 
 104. Id. at 229 (quoting J.W. Seavey Hop, 147 P.2d at 316).  See also Bort v. 
Parker, 42 P.3d 980, 987 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (“A trial court may resort to 
parol evidence for the limited purpose of construing the otherwise clear and 
unambiguous language of a contract in order to determine the intent of the 
parties.”). 
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Some jurisdictions, such as Washington, have argued 
that the context rule will not inject uncertainty into 
contractual relationships because the plain meaning rule 
“effectively does the same thing as the context rule.”105
If a context rule is applied, there will be no effective loss in 
the certainty of writings, since it is submitted that the 
plain meaning rule is used only where there is no 
difference over the sense of the words anyway.  Where this 
is so, evidence on the context in which the words were 
used would produce the same result as a reading of the 
face of the writing.  Where it is not so, the plain meaning 
rule either gives way to its exception, which allows the 
consideration of context evidence or it stands as a 
mechanically applied bar to the most relevant obtainable 
evidence of the sense of the words which the parties 
desired to employ.
  As the 
court in Eagle Insurance Co. v. Albright explained: 
106
But as discussed below, there are fundamental problems 
with applying extrinsic evidence of the parties’ subjective 
intent to determine the meaning of the terms by which the 
parties agreed to be bound.  Contrary to the reassurances of 
the court in Eagle Insurance, the context rule can and does 
lead to uncertainty in contract interpretation.  By letting in 
all extrinsic evidence of the intent of the parties, the context 
rule unmoors the courts from shared and public standards of 
meaning and thereby invites gamesmanship and creates 
uncertainty. 
 
A. Problems with the Context Rule 
1. Hunt Foods & Industries, Inc. v. Doliner, Illustrating 
the Problem 
The case of Hunt Foods & Industries, Inc. v. Doliner107 
shows how the context rule can completely unmoor the 
process of contract interpretation from the language that the 
parties chose to govern any future dispute between them.108
 
 105. Eagle Ins. Co. v. Albright, 474 P.2d 920, 929 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970). 
  
 106. Id. (citing 3 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, § 536 (1960); 4 
SAMUEL WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §§ 609, 618, 629 (3d ed. 1961); 
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 230 (1932)). 
 107. Hunt Foods & Indus., Inc. v. Doliner, 270 N.Y.S.2d 937 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1966). 
 108. See Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott, Contract Design and the Structure 
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In Hunt Foods, the court considered whether a facially 
unconditional option to purchase stock could be treated as a 
conditional option based upon communications between the 
parties outside of the contract itself.109
The parties in this case had been negotiating the sale of 
the defendant’s shares in a corporation.
 
110  When negotiations 
stalled, the parties entered into an option contract, under 
which the plaintiff had the right to purchase all of the 
defendant’s shares for $5.50 a share.111  The plaintiff paid 
$1000 in exchange for the option to purchase the shares.112
The defendant admitted that, during the negotiations, his 
counsel had “called attention to the fact that the option was 
unconditional in its terms . . . .”
 
113  However, the defendant’s 
attorney said “he obtained an understanding that [the option] 
was only to be used in the event that [the defendant] solicited 
an outside offer . . . .”114  The defendant further admitted that 
the “plaintiff insisted that unless the option was signed in 
unconditional form negotiations would terminate.”115
The Court of Appeals, nonetheless, held that the alleged 
oral agreement that the option would only be exercisable if 
the defendant entertained outside offers raised a sufficient 
question of fact for the defendant to survive summary 
judgment.
 
116  While the defendant recognized that the option 
term was facially unconditional, the court ruled that evidence 
that the option term was, in fact, conditional did not 
contradict the parties’ written contract and was admissible.117
Hunt Foods is an excellent example of a case where the 
resort to extrinsic evidence undermined any certainty that 
the parties had in relying upon the written terms of their 
contract.
 
118
 
of Contractual Intent, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1023, 1048–53 (2009). 
  The defendant’s own attorney recognized and 
 109. Hunt Foods, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 939. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id.  
 116. Id. at 940. 
 117. Id. at 939–40.  “The conversations in this case, some of which are not 
disputed, and the expectation of all the parties for further negotiations, suggest 
that the alleged oral condition precedent cannot be precluded as a matter of law 
. . . .”  Id. at 940. 
 118. Case reports illustrating the problems with the context rule are, by 
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reported to the defendant that the option term was 
unconditional.119  What is more, the plaintiff refused the 
defendant’s request to include language making the plaintiff’s 
option conditional.120  It is hard to see how the plaintiff in this 
case could have expressed his intent to obtain an 
unconditional option more clearly.  As Professors Kraus and 
Scott recognized, the defendant “could not reasonably have 
believed both that [the plaintiff] was content to receive a 
legally conditional option and that [the plaintiff] had good 
reason to insist that the condition not be stated in the 
writing.”121
By looking to extrinsic evidence contrary to the written 
contractual terms the parties knowingly chose, the court 
undermined the parties’ ability to firmly and effectively set 
their agreement into writing in a manner that would be 
predictably enforced by the court. 
 
2. Memory and Veracity 
Just as Professor Solan explains that the plain meaning 
rule can lead to dishonest conduct (especially in consumer 
contracts), Professor Solan also explains that the context rule 
invites its own variety of gamesmanship and dishonesty.122  
“A frequent justification for the parol evidence rule . . . is the 
desire to improve the resolution of business disputes by 
creating a process that is relatively free from unreliable types 
of evidence, from the whims of jurors, and from 
dishonesty.”123
 
nature, difficult to come by.  An opinion is not simply a recounting of the facts 
and legal conclusions of the case.  An opinion is also a justification of the legal 
conclusions reached by the court.  As such, courts will naturally report facts 
that make their legal conclusions appear reasonable and correct, while 
excluding facts that undermine their conclusions. 
  “Privileging the written contract serves a 
useful function precisely because people do forget what was 
said, and because people really do testify dishonestly, or at 
least consistently with a self-serving reality that they have 
 119. Id. at 939. 
 120. Id.  
 121. Kraus & Scott, supra note 108, at 1053.  The court did not attempt to 
analyze the parties’ alleged oral understanding under equitable doctrines such 
as estoppel.  Such a claim would likely have failed.  It is hard to see how one 
could reasonably rely upon an agreement that another party is explicitly 
refusing to make part of the written contract. 
 122. See Solan, supra note 51, at 87–90. 
 123. Id. at 95 (footnote omitted). 
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created in their own minds about events underlying a 
litigation.”124
Professor Solan backs this point with several studies that 
demonstrate just how fallible human memory is, especially 
where a party has an incentive to remember things a certain 
way.  “Basically, we remember two seconds of verbatim 
speech.  What happens with the information after the actual 
words cannot be recalled is still a matter of active research 
and debate among psychologists of language.  But the fact 
that the actual words remain with us only briefly is 
uncontroversial.”
 
125  He then describes several studies that 
have shown that while we are capable of remembering the 
gist of what we hear and read, we are very bad at 
remembering the details.126
To make matters worse, these studies show that our 
recollections are very suggestible.  Specifically, how we recall 
past events is greatly influenced by the way in which we are 
asked about them.
 
127
Imagine, then, what happens when a corporate executive 
is interviewed by lawyers about the circumstances 
surrounding the execution of a contract that is now in 
litigation.  Assume that the executive is basically an 
honest person, but has only sketchy memory of the events.  
The lawyers brief their client on how the case seems to be 
coming together and ask—quite in earnest—whether the 
executive recalls facts relating to the negotiation that can 
be helpful.  Much of the time, I submit, that executive’s 
memory will be appropriately jogged, and he will testify at 
the deposition to the events the lawyers want to hear as 
though they had just happened yesterday.  This is not 
  This problem is greatly magnified in 
litigation, where parties are under tremendous economic and 
peer pressure to recall events in a manner that is helpful to 
their claims: 
 
 124. Id. at 89–90. 
 125. Id. at 95. 
 126. Id. at 96–97 (citing Jacqueline Strunk Sachs, Recognition Memory for 
Syntactic and Semantic Aspects of Connected Discourse, 2 PERCEPTION & 
PSYCHOPHYSICS 437 (1967); Amina Memon & A. Daniel Yarmey, Earwitness 
Recall and Identification: Comparison of the Cognitive Interview and the 
Structured Interview, 88 PERCEPTUAL AND MOTOR SKILLS 797 (1999)). 
 127. See Solan, supra note 51 at 97 (citing Elizabeth F. Loftus & John C. 
Palmer, Reconstruction of Automobile Destruction: An Example of the 
Interaction Between Language and Memory, 13 J. VERBAL LEARNING & VERBAL 
BEHAV. 585 (1974)). 
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because he is a liar.  It is because he has reconstructed the 
story in such a way as to integrate helpful scenarios into 
the parts of the story that he actually remembers.  I recall 
such experiences from my own practice as a litigator, and 
I have interviewed corporate lawyers in connection with 
this project whose recollections also accord with this 
view.128
Of course, there is also the problem of lying, especially 
where such economic and peer pressure is brought to bear.  
Professor Solan also points to a growing body of social science 
literature suggesting that our system of commercial 
exchange, especially in the context of corporate structures, 
creates strong incentives for dishonest behavior: 
 
Social psychologists have, over the past decade, identified 
incentive systems within the corporate structure that 
appear to encourage sharp practices and dishonesty.  
Recently, various anthologies of studies about corporate 
ethics have been published.  Serious acts of wrongdoing 
committed by business executives are seen not as the 
isolated acts of bad people, but rather as the predictable 
consequences of pressures and incentives in today’s 
corporate culture.129
This incentive towards dishonesty in corporate structures 
is yet further support for a more restrictive rules regarding 
extrinsic evidence in disputes over negotiated commercial 
contracts.  This is, in essence, the flip side of Professor Solan’s 
earlier point that restrictive rules for extrinsic evidence tend 
to magnify the power disparities attendant to consumer 
contracts of adhesion.  A restrictive rule for extrinsic evidence 
can restrain a party’s ability to gain advantage through 
dishonesty since it is much more difficult to lie about the 
language of a written contract than it is to lie about what was 
said and done outside of the four corners of the contract. 
 
3. The Context Rule and Extrinsic Evidence at Odds 
with Apparent Plain Meaning 
Jurisdictions that have adopted the context rule often 
also hold that while extrinsic evidence is admissible to shed 
light on the intent of the parties—and therefore the meaning 
of contract language—it is not admissible to vary or 
 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 98. 
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contradict the written terms of a contract.130
This first notion is but the plain meaning rule in 
contextualist clothing, and is not how courts that have 
adopted the context rule apply it.
  This 
construction of the context rule, however, is problematic and 
fails to address the problems associated with the context rule 
discussed above.  Specifically, the “no varying or 
contradicting” rule entails one of two problematic 
consequences.  Either a) the judge must first determine the 
plain meaning of the contract so as to determine whether 
certain extrinsic evidence varies or contradicts it, or b) the 
rule requires extrinsic evidence to establish what the contract 
means in the first place, and accordingly, such extrinsic 
evidence could never contradict the meaning of a word or 
phrase that it itself has given. 
131
The second notion creates a problem of circularity.  How 
can extrinsic evidence, which is used to give the contract 
meaning in the first place, ever contradict the very meaning 
that the extrinsic evidence has given the contract?  For this to 
happen, the extrinsic evidence would have to mean both X 
and not X, i.e., it would have to vary or contradict itself.  In 
practice, this second way of applying the “no varying or 
contradicting” version of the context rule boils down to an 
appeal to the judge’s common sense or gut feeling that certain 
language really can only support a certain range of 
meaning—a kind of plain meaning light. 
  If the court can already 
determine the plain meaning of a contract such that it can 
determine whether extrinsic evidence contradicts the plain 
meaning, why consider extrinsic evidence at all?  In such a 
case, the court already has the contract’s plain meaning. 
As shown in the Hunt Foods case, the context rule can 
lead courts to engage in rather violent contortions in order to 
show that the extrinsic evidence the court is relying upon 
supplements rather than contradicts the language of the 
contract.  In Hunt Foods, the court explained that its 
 
 130. In re Marriage of Schweitzer, 937 P.2d 1062, 1066 (Wash. 1997) 
(explaining that a court cannot “ ‘ add[ ] to, modify[ ], or contradict[ ] the terms 
of a written contract, in the absence of fraud, accident, or mistake.’ ”  (quoting 
Berg v. Hudesman, 801 P.2d 222, 229 (Wash. 1990))). 
 131. See Berg, 801 P.2d at 230 (“We thus reject the theory that ambiguity in 
the meaning of contract language must exist before evidence of the surrounding 
circumstances is admissible.  Cases to the contrary are overruled.”). 
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interpretation that an unconditional option was in fact 
conditional was not a contradiction because the condition 
merely “lessened” the effect of the option and did not “negate” 
it.132  It is hard to see the terms “conditional” and 
“unconditional” as compatible with one another.  At the very 
least, the tensions within the court’s interpretation of the 
option language (especially when the defendant admitted that 
the written option was facially unconditional) illustrates a 
problem with requiring courts to determine whether extrinsic 
evidence contradicts or merely supplements the terms of a 
contract.133
One initially appealing retort to this criticism is that the 
no varying or contradicting rule only comes into play where 
the court is choosing between the various possible meanings 
of a word or phrase.  But this cannot be what is meant in 
jurisdictions that apply the context rule.  In such 
jurisdictions, extrinsic evidence is admissible to determine in 
the first place the various possible meanings that a word or 
phrase might bear—i.e., extrinsic evidence must be 
considered when determining whether the word or phrase is 
ambiguous in the first instance.
 
134
4. While the Context Rule Looks to the Parties’ 
Subjective Intent, Divining the Parties’ Subjective 
Intent Is Problematic 
  Evidence used to establish 
that a word or phrase is ambiguous could never contradict the 
word or phrase in question since that evidence has itself 
established the range of possible meanings.  Put another way, 
the evidence that defines what a word means logically cannot 
contradict what a word means. 
Under the context rule, courts look to extrinsic evidence 
to determine the subjective intent of the parties, but as 
explained below, determining the parties’ subjective intent is 
highly problematic for several reasons.135
 
 132. Hunt Foods & Indus., Inc. v. Doliner, 270 N.Y.S.2d 937, 940 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1966) (“To be inconsistent the term must contradict or negate a term of the 
writing.  A term or condition which has a lesser effect is provable.”). 
  Even courts 
 133. See Schwartz & Scott, Contract Theory, supra note 1, at 571 n.58. 
 134. See Admiral Builders Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. S. River Landing, Inc., 502 
A.2d 1096, 1099 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986). 
 135. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at § 7.9.  While Farnsworth acknowledges 
that parties usually do not have a shared intent, he nonetheless describes the 
“court’s task” in such cases as “applying a standard of reasonableness to 
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applying the context rule have recognized that looking to the 
subjective intent of the parties is not workable—at least in 
regard to whether the parties have formed a contract.  In 
complex negotiated commercial contracts, it is difficult to 
assign a single intent to the language of a contract that was 
negotiated and drafted by numerous individuals on each side 
of the contract.  If parties are litigating the interpretation of a 
contract in good faith, then those parties must not have had a 
single intent, at least in regard to the subject matter of their 
dispute. 
i. The Context Rule’s Focus on Subjective Intent Is 
Incompatible with the Objective Theory of 
Contracts 
It is a long held assumption in the law of contracts that 
what ought to govern the interpretation of a contract is the 
intent of the parties.  As a 1795 case from the Supreme Court 
of North Carolina held: “The true intent of the parties to be 
regulated by that contract, shall not be defeated and justice 
overturned, so long as any evidence remains which throws 
any glimmering of light on that subject, from which a jury 
may be enabled to infer the real state of the transaction.”136
This is especially true of courts that apply the context 
rule, which has as its primary justification the notion that 
extrinsic evidence of the context in which the parties entered 
into their contract is essential to properly identify the parties’ 
intent.
 
137
The second concept that underlies our analysis is this 
state’s so-called “context rule.” . . . We include “the subject 
matter and objective of the contract, all circumstances 
surrounding its formation, the subsequent acts and 
conduct of the parties, statements made by the parties in 
preliminary negotiations, and usage of trade and course of 
 
 
determine which party’s intention is to be carried out . . . .”  Id.  This Article’s 
critique of the parties’ intent goes further by questioning whether the court can 
determine the parties’ subjective intent at all, regardless of whether the parties 
had the same intent or not. 
 136. Ingram v. Hall, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 193, 207 (N.C. 1795). 
 137. While courts applying the plain meaning rule recite the same truism 
that the touchstone of contract interpretation is the intent of the parties, such 
courts focus on the language of the contract as the best indicator of the parties’ 
intent.  See Tallmadge Bros., Inc. v. Iroquois Gas Transmission Sys., L.P., 746 
A.2d 1277, 1289 (Conn. 2000). 
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dealings.”  This approach permits us to then “discover the 
intent of the parties based on their real meeting of the 
minds, as opposed to insufficient written expression of 
their intent.”138
Here, the court is not referring to objective 
manifestations of intent.
 
139
The notion that parties even have a single unified intent 
at the moment of execution is also not axiomatic.  And if 
parties frequently do not have such a unified intent, even 
where they both knowingly and fully agree to the language of 
a particular contract, then the endeavor of determining the 
parties’ intent would, in such cases, be impossible. 
  The court is looking for the 
parties’ actual, subjective, and presumably unitary intent 
(even if it will not allow the parties to testify to their 
subjective understandings directly).  Indeed, courts almost 
universally invoke the intent of the parties as the touchstone 
of all contract interpretation.  How close courts come to 
matching their interpretations to what the parties actually 
subjectively intended is the barometer by which courts 
applying the context rule judge their success or failure in 
interpreting a contract. 
Even while seeking the parties’ subjective intent, courts 
recognize that determining a shared subjective intent among 
the parties to a contract is problematic: 
Article 2 does not, however, require a “true ‘meeting of the 
minds.’ ”   Rather, the objective theory of contracts is used.  
The objective theory stresses an outward manifestation of 
assent made by one party to the other party.  The parties’ 
objective intent and what a reasonably prudent person 
would have believed from the actions or words of the 
parties is analyzed.140
 
 138. Carpenter v. Remtech, Inc., 226 P.3d 159, 161–62 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010) 
(emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Berg v. Hudesman, 801 P.2d 222, 
228 (Wash. 1990); Tjart v. Smith Barney, Inc.,  28 P.3d 823, 828–29 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 2001)). 
 
 139. See also Michael L. Boyer, Contract as Text: Interpretive Overlap in Law 
and Literature, 12 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 167, 171 (2003) (“The parol evidence 
rule is characterized by two schools of thought: the mechanical conception of 
Professor Williston, emphasizing the agreement and its plain meaning, and the 
modern approach of Professor Corbin, emphasizing the parties’ intentions and 
use of extrinsic evidence to reveal these intentions.”) (citing Stephen F. Ross & 
Daniel Tranen, The Modern Parol Evidence Rule and Its Implications for New 
Textualist Statutory Interpretation, 87 GEO. L.J. 195, 199–207 (1998)). 
 140. Dean Mach. Co. v. Union Bank, 106 S.W.3d 510, 521 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) 
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Indeed, at least when it comes to issues of contract 
formation, courts now universally hold that it is not the 
parties’ actual subjective agreement that matters, but instead 
it is the parties’ outward expressions of agreement to a 
written document that determines whether the agreement is 
binding. 
Even in jurisdictions that have adopted the context rule, 
courts have all but done away with the notion that parties 
must have a subjective meeting of the minds in order to form 
a contract.  As Justice Friendly quoted Justice Holmes in the 
Frigaliment Importing Co. case, “the making of a contract 
depends not on the agreement of two minds in one intention, 
but on the agreement of two sets of external signs—not on the 
parties’ having meant the same thing but on their having said 
the same thing.” 141  As Justice Posner recognized, “[m]ost 
contract disputes arise because the parties did not foresee 
and provide for some contingency that has now 
materialized—so there was no meeting of minds on the 
matter at issue—yet such disputes are treated as disputes 
over contractual meaning, not as grounds for rescinding the 
contract . . . .”142
Courts applying the context rule deal with the 
contradiction between the objective theory of contracts and 
the search for the parties’ subjective intent by applying the 
objective theory of contracts to determine whether a contract 
was formed, but then determining what the contract means 
by reference to the parties subjective intent.
  Thus, even jurisdictions that apply the 
context rule when interpreting contracts tacitly recognize the 
problems with relying upon the parties’ subjective intent 
when they apply the objective theory of contracts to formation 
issues. 
143
 
(citations omitted).  The apparent conflict between the court’s explication of the 
context rule in Carpenter and the court’s explication of the context rule in Dean 
illustrates an insoluble conflict between the objective theory of contract and the 
context rule.  The objective theory of contract seeks apparent meaning (based 
upon what a reasonably prudent person would interpret) while the context rule 
seeks subjective meaning (i.e., what the parties in fact intended). 
  Courts do so 
by invoking notions like the parties’ actual intent or true 
 141. Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int’l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116, 
117 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (citation omitted). 
 142. Colfax Envelope Corp. v. Local No. 458-3M, Chi. Graphic Commc’n Int’l 
Union, 20 F.3d 750, 752 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 143. Compare Carpenter, 226 P.3d at 161–62, with Argo Welded Prods., Inc. 
v. J.T. Ryerson Steel & Sons, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 583, 592 (E.D. Pa. 1981).  
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meeting of the minds.144
ii. The Realities of Negotiating and the Illusion of 
Unitary Intent 
  While this procedure allows courts 
to apply these rules consistently, it does not resolve the 
inherent contradiction between a rule that admits that 
contracts can be formed without a subjective meeting of the 
minds, and a rule that requires courts to seek out a subjective 
meeting of the minds when interpreting the same contract.  
Indeed, putting to one side the possibility that either party is 
lying, the very fact that a dispute has arisen suggests that 
the parties did not have a shared subjective intent, at least in 
regard to the subject matter of their dispute. 
Given the nature of how complex commercial contracts 
are negotiated and the incentives of the parties to jockey for 
advantage, there is good reason to think that parties often do 
not have a unified intent when they agree to sign a complex 
commercial contract, at least as to those details that end up 
being litigated. 
First, complex commercial contracts are not simple 
agreements between two individuals reduced to writing.  
Such contracts are almost always entered into between 
corporations controlled by varying numbers of officers, 
directors, managers, etc.  The individual that signs a contract 
may or may not be among the several individuals who 
negotiated the contract for one side.  Even the individuals on 
one side of a contract who all agree to its written terms may 
not all have a single unitary intent regarding exactly what 
those terms mean.  Perhaps different individuals, even on one 
side of the contract, drafted different portions of it.  And 
perhaps those responsible for agreeing to the contract were 
not the ones who drafted it.  In such cases, contracts begin to 
look less like expressions of shared underlying intent, and 
more like agreements to be bound by particular language. 
Second, negotiating commercial contracts is not a 
communal activity, but rather a competitive sport.  Such 
negotiations may not be a truly zero sum game where one 
party wins, and the other party loses.  There are certainly 
provisions in commercial contracts that both parties want and 
both will benefit from.  However, the goal of any form of 
 
 144. See Argo Welded, 528 F. Supp. at 591–92.  
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commercial negotiation in a competitive capitalist economy is 
to capture the greatest profit—usually at the expense of the 
other party to the negotiation.  Under such circumstances, 
each party does not agree to contractual language simply to 
set into writing their agreement.  They agree to language 
because they believe that it will provide them with an 
advantage should a dispute arise.  As to any given provision, 
both parties cannot be right. 
For example, the parties to a fixed-price construction 
contract might agree that, should the owner terminate its 
contract with the contractor at any point prior to final 
completion, the contractor is entitled to a prorated share of 
the fixed-price based upon the percentage of completion.  The 
contractor might have agreed to this term believing that it 
would be interpreted to mean percentage completion based 
upon the amount spent to date on the project compared to the 
amount the contractor would have to spend to finish it.  The 
owner, on the other hand, might have agreed to this term 
believing that percentage of completion is the ratio of the 
amount the owner has paid the contractor to the amount the 
owner would have to pay to complete the project.  The parties 
might have agreed to this language, not because they actually 
reached an agreement as to what this term means, but 
because each party believed it could win a dispute over what 
this term means.  This does not mean that the parties failed 
to reach an agreement, but rather, that they calculated the 
effects of their agreement differently.145
Parties negotiating a commercial contract are not simply 
negotiating about the subject matter of the contract.  The 
language of the contract itself is part of what is being 
bargained for.  A party may agree to take a lower payment in 
return for language that the party believes will advantage it 
should a dispute arise.  Parties will also often horse trade 
contract language—“I do not like section 2.B. of the contract, 
but we can keep it if you agree to this new provision in section 
3, which we would like.”  Here, parties are not concerned 
simply with setting their intent into writing, but with getting 
language into the contract that they can rely upon and that 
 
 
 145. Calling such a contract ambiguous does not save the context rule from 
its reliance upon the parties’ subjective intent.  If the parties believed that the 
term would be interpreted differently, the intent of the parties is of no help and 
extrinsic evidence of the subjective intent of the parties is irrelevant. 
GOLDSTEIN FINAL 7/1/2013  2:07 PM 
108 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53 
they believe will benefit them should a dispute arise. 
5. For Communication to Occur, the Meaning of 
Language Cannot be Grounded in the Intent of 
the Parties 
As discussed above in Part III.A.4, courts applying the 
context rule see evidence of the parties’ subjective intent as 
necessary to interpret what a contract means.  But there are 
good reasons to be skeptical about whether a contract’s 
meaning must be determined by direct reference to the 
subjective intent of the parties.146  As Professor Ricks argues, 
the contextualist attack upon the plain meaning rule is 
flawed because it presumes that the meaning of a contract 
must be the intent of the parties.147
First, the judges assert that plain meaning could only be 
found by reading a document if words had inherent 
meaning, or absolute and constant referents.  But they do 
not, the argument goes.  Second, the opinions claim that 
the meaning of words is actually the thoughts and 
intentions of the speaker, or perhaps the speaker and 
hearer.  No written contract could ever adequately reveal 
these.  Plain meaning is therefore impossible.  This claim 
is left irrefuted in the casebooks and contract law 
literature . . . .
 
148
. . . . 
 
But the claim that plain meaning is impossible is false, as 
are its premises. . . . [W]ords cannot be the thoughts and 
intentions of the speaker, hearer, or anyone else 
. . . .[P]lain meaning does not require that words have 
“inherent meaning” or “absolute and constant referents.”  
Plain meaning is possible and occurs quite apart from 
reference or another theory of inherent meaning.  Plain 
meaning rests instead on our unreflective, public, 
conventional practice of language use.149
In other words, it is how words are used publically by 
convention that comes to define their meaning, not what any 
 
 
 146. Val D. Ricks, The Possibility of Plain Meaning: Wittgenstein and the 
Contract Precedents, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 767, 769 (2008) (“Drawing on the 
philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, . . . the meaning of words cannot be the 
thoughts and intentions of the speaker, hearer, or anyone else.”). 
 147. Id. at 768. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 769. 
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particular user intends.  For communication to be possible, 
meaning must be based upon public and shared 
conventions.150  “The thoughts and intents of the speaker and 
writer, hearer and listener, are irrelevant to the meaning of 
language.  Meaning is not subjective and personal.  Instead, 
the meaning of language is necessarily public and objective.  
The meaning lies in the consistent, conventional patterns of 
our usage.”151
A language that has meaning by reference only to what 
the speaker or the hearer intends, in fact, has no meaning at 
all.
 
152
The difficulty with such a language is that no “criterion for 
correctness” for the use of it exists.  Language, to have 
meaning, must be used consistently.  (Wittgenstein’s way 
to express this consistency was to say that language is 
used “according to rule” . . . .)[.]  Moreover, some way to 
check the consistency must exist so that users of the 
language know whether language is being used 
meaningfully or not.  But no method exists to keep a 
wholly private language consistent, or to check it for 
consistency.
  Professor Ricks summarizes Wittgenstein’s argument 
to this effect as follows: 
153
This observation, that for communication to be possible, 
the meaning must be based upon public and shared 
conventions, undermines not only the context rule, but also 
the plain meaning rule to the extent the plain meaning rule 
excludes extrinsic evidence of the public and conventional 
meaning of words or phrases.  Context is essential to 
meaning, but only to the extent that such context is public 
and shared.
 
154
Even when courts apply the plain meaning rule, they are 
not discerning the meaning outside of any context.  Of course, 
such a thing would be impossible.  Even when courts do not 
utilize extrinsic evidence, judges bring to a text all of their 
internalized rules for common usage—rules of grammar, 
 
 
 150. Id. at 784. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 785–86 (citing LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL 
INVESTIGATIONS ¶ 202 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., Basil Blackwell Ltd. 3d ed. 
1986) (1953)). 
 153. Id. at 785 (footnote omitted) (citing WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 152, ¶ 
258). 
 154. See id. 
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syntax, etc.—through which they interpret the contract,155 
even when purportedly limited to the four corners of the 
contract.  This phenomenon is best typified by courts’ 
frequent referral to an English dictionary—a document 
outside the contract itself—even when applying the plain 
meaning rule.156
Take for example the famous case of Frigaliment 
Importing Co. v. 
 
B.N.S. International Sales Corp., where the 
court, in first determining whether the word “chicken” is 
ambiguous, looked to the dictionary definition of the term.157
The issue is, what is chicken?  Plaintiff says “chicken” 
means a young chicken, suitable for broiling and frying.  
Defendant says “chicken” means any bird of that genus 
that meets contract specifications on weight and quality, 
including what it calls “stewing chicken” and plaintiff 
pejoratively terms “fowl”.  Dictionaries give both 
meanings, as well as some others not relevant here.
 
158
Contrary to the contextualist critique of the plain 
meaning rule, it is possible to consistently assign meaning to 
words and phrases in a contract based upon the text of the 
contract alone and the tools available to courts applying the 
plain meaning rule.  The question is whether the plain 
meaning rule (or the context rule or the public meaning rule 
suggested by this Article) will assist courts in interpreting 
contracts in a way that reflects the purposes for which parties 
enter into contracts.  As explained below in Part IV.B., that 
purpose must include the ability to predictably constrain 
another party’s behavior.  And if this indeed is an essential 
purpose of contracts, the observation that communication is 
only possible via public and shared conventions for what 
words mean entails that contracts must be interpreted 
according to such shared and public conventions if contracts 
are to serve their essential function.  Put simply, if parties 
 
 
 155. Id. at 801–02 (“The context of the plain meaning rule includes the 
contract itself, whatever of the commercial context that can be discerned from 
the contract, the learning and background of the judge, and the arguments that 
litigants offer regarding whether the language is clear. . . . The grammatical 
rules by which language has meaning, even plain meaning, can function in this 
setting, in this context.”). 
 156. Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int’l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116, 
117 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
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cannot rely upon public and shared conventions for meaning 
they cannot predictably constrain others’ behavior, and this 
undermines the purpose for which parties enter into 
contracts. 
IV. A PROPOSED RULE FOR NEGOTIATED COMMERCIAL 
CONTRACTS 
So far, this Article has addressed problems with both the 
plain meaning rule and the context rule, which govern when 
and what kinds of extrinsic evidence are admissible to 
interpret a contract that appears unambiguous on its face.  
The plain meaning rule is flawed (at least in its claims that 
words have absolute meaning) because the language of a 
contract can only have meaning in context.  Furthermore, the 
plain meaning rule relies upon judges’ subjective 
preconceptions regarding what the terms in a contract mean.  
Looking only to the language of the contract itself, and 
holding the parties to it, can also allow more sophisticated 
parties to take advantage of less sophisticated parties.  
Finally, the language of the contract alone cannot shed light 
on what the parties to the contract actually intended, and it is 
the intent of the parties that defines what a contract means 
(or so contextualists argue). 
But the context rule is problematic in its own way.  Many 
kinds of extrinsic evidence are inherently unreliable.  Parties 
misremember and parties lie, and it is much easier to fake or 
misrepresent extrinsic evidence than it is to fake or 
misrepresent the language of the contract itself.  
Furthermore, there are good reasons to doubt that divining 
the intent of the parties, especially in complex commercial 
contracts, is possible.  Parties often do not have a shared 
intent regarding the matters or factual circumstances that 
end up being litigated, but instead only agree to be bound to 
the particular language of their contract.  This is especially 
true in contracts between commercial entities, where various 
individuals negotiate, approve, and sign contracts even on 
behalf of a single party—thus making a unitary intent even 
more problematic.  More fundamentally, in order for 
communication to occur, the meaning of words or phrases 
cannot be based upon the intent of the party stating them, 
but instead derives from the way the terms of the contract are 
publically and conventionally used within language. 
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The notion that meaning, in communication generally 
and in contracts in particular, must be based upon shared 
and public conventions of usage provides the basis for a rule 
that addresses the problems with the strong forms of both the 
plain meaning rule and the context rule.  If the meaning of a 
word, phrase, or text must be based upon shared and public 
conventions, then evidence aimed at the subjective intent of 
one or both of the parties should not be what courts look to in 
order to interpret contract language.  Rather, evidence of the 
shared and public conventions for how a word or phrase is 
used in language ought to govern how a court interprets a 
word or phrase.  The public meaning rule allows parties to 
submit evidence of such shared and public conventions at the 
initial stage of contract interpretation, while excluding 
evidence offered to show the subjective intent of one or more 
of the parties, evidence that, as discussed above, is highly 
problematic. 
This Article’s response to the contextualist critique of the 
plain meaning rule is to untie meaning from both the 
subjective notions of a judge (under a strict plain meaning 
rule) and from extrinsic evidence of the subjective intent of 
the parties (under the context rule).  Instead, meaning must 
be fastened to the public and shared conventions for the 
usage of words and phrases within language, which courts 
can determine through evidence of how a word or phrase in a 
contract is, in fact, publically and conventionally used. 
The rule proposed in this Article would be applied by a 
court as follows: When interpreting the meaning of a contract, 
the court would first look to whether the contract has a 
single, unambiguous meaning in light of the language of the 
contract itself.  In addition, the court would also look to 
evidence of how the words or phrases in the contract are 
publically and conventionally used in language, such as trade 
usage.  The court would also require each party to produce 
limited biographical extrinsic evidence that the parties are 
members of a group that employs the usage of the term or 
phrase, which the party advocates.  Put another way, the 
parties, at this initial stage, must submit extrinsic evidence 
to prove that their proposed usage is relevant, and/or that the 
other parties’ proposed usage is not relevant.  Courts at this 
stage would not admit evidence of what one or both of the 
parties subjectively understood the words or phrases in the 
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contract to mean.  If the contract is still ambiguous, the court 
would resort to equitable principles to determine a fair 
outcome, and allow any extrinsic evidence relevant to that 
endeavor. 
The result of the public meaning rule proposed by this 
Article is that after the initial stage of contract 
interpretation, courts will be left with a definite list of the 
possible meanings that the word or phrase at issue may bear, 
i.e., those interpretations that are supported by evidence of 
what the word or phrase in fact means in language.  Words 
and phrases can only have a certain range of conventional 
meanings within a particular group of speakers, otherwise 
communication would be impossible.  Under the public 
meaning rule, parties will not be able to present evidence that 
the word or phrase at issue has a meaning outside of the 
boundaries of usage relevant to the parties.159
This Article is not concerned with the order of preference 
courts apply to the various types of extrinsic evidence, per se.  
Rather, this Article argues that courts should not consider 
certain types of extrinsic evidence at the initial stage where 
the court determines whether a contract is ambiguous.  The 
hierarchy of extrinsic evidence is important under any 
interpretive theory that looks to multiple categories of 
extrinsic evidence at any particular phase.  However, the 
thesis of this Article is that only one category of extrinsic 
evidence—evidence of the public and shared meaning of a 
word or phrase—should be admitted during the first phase of 
contract interpretation where the court determines whether 
the contract is ambiguous.  The practical effect of the rule 
proposed in this Article is that evidence of usage will be 
privileged over other forms of extrinsic evidence.  But the 
order in which courts apply categories of extrinsic evidence 
other than usage (only after determining that a contract is 
ambiguous) is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 
 
 
 159. While, as discussed above, courts that apply the context rule generally 
also hold that extrinsic evidence cannot be used to vary or contradict the terms 
of the contract, the public meaning rule provides a procedure for putting this 
notion into practice that is far more concrete and less reflexive.  See infra Part 
IV.A.  The public meaning rule is grounded in more than the court’s reflexive 
notions of whether a purported definition is simply “beyond the pale.” 
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A. Example Categories: Trade Usage Versus Course of 
Performance and Course of Dealing 
There are numerous categories of extrinsic evidence that 
parties can submit in contract litigation.  They include 
evidence of the parties’ course of dealing, evidence of the 
parties’ course of performance, evidence of the parties’ pre-
contract negotiations, evidence of the parties’ communications 
post-contract, evidence of internal communications by one of 
the parties to the contract, evidence of trade usage, and so on.  
Rather than address each of these categories, this Section 
addresses a few in particular as examples of extrinsic 
evidence that are relevant to the public and conventional 
meaning of words in language and examples that are not. 
1. Evidence of Public and Conventional Usage 
Unlike course of dealing and course of performance, 
evidence of public and conventional usage (such as trade 
usage as described in Article 1 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code160 and the Restatement of Contracts (Second)161) is 
evidence of the very conventions that make communication 
possible.  Courts frequently refer to dictionary definitions 
when attempting to determine the meaning of contract 
terms162
But the dictionary is not the final word on the proper 
usage of terms.  A dictionary is an attempt to catalogue public 
usage.  It does not itself define public usage. 
 and reliance upon a dictionary is appropriate given 
the dictionary’s functions as a guide to common usage. 
A dictionary, it is vital to observe, never says what 
meaning a word must bear in a particular context.  Nor 
does it ever purport to say this.  An unabridged dictionary 
is simply an historical record, not necessarily all-inclusive, 
of the meanings which words in fact have borne . . . .  The 
editors make up this record by collecting examples of uses 
of the word to be defined, studying each use in context, 
and then forming a judgment about the meaning in that 
context.163
 
 160. U.C.C. § 1-205(2) (1978). 
 
 161. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(5) (1979). 
 162. See, e.g., Frigaliment Importing Co., 190 F. Supp. at 117. 
 163. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC 
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1190 (William N. 
Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey eds., 1994). 
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The dictionary is a starting point, not an end point, in the 
court’s search for what a word or phrase means.  Evidence of 
trade usage, usage within a particular region, usage among 
speakers of a particular dialect, etc. allows parties to 
supplement dictionary definitions and the judge’s 
understanding of common usage with evidence of other 
particular public usages of a term among particular groups, 
specifically groups to which one or more of the parties 
belong.164
For example, the common usage of the term “hacker” 
among computer programmers is “an expert at programming 
and solving problems with a computer.”
 
165  The common 
usage of the term “hacker” outside of this subgroup of 
computer programmers, however, is a person who uses a 
computer to gain unauthorized access to data.166
To solve the first problem, parties must be able to submit 
evidence of common usages of the term.  For example, an 
English dictionary lists both of the above definitions.  But 
what if an American-English dictionary only listed the second 
  It is 
impossible for a court to determine which meaning is 
appropriate for a given contract unless the court is a) aware 
of both usages of the term, and b) can determine whether the 
contract is properly situated within the particular subgroup 
of computer programmers or is properly situated within the 
subgroup of non-computer programmers. 
 
 164. In response to this notion that meaning derives from the common usage 
of a terms as employed by a group (as opposed to the intent of the parties), one 
might ask: why can’t the parties be considered a “group” with its own 
conventions of usage? 
     First, parties enter into contracts, not just to communicate with each other, 
but to communicate with a third-party arbiter should a dispute between the 
parties arise.  For this reason, as discussed in Part IV.2, it would be irrational 
for parties to use language in an idiosyncratic way, such as attempting to create 
a private language and then drafting a contract in that private language. 
     Second, for language to communicate, there must be public and shared 
conventions of usage.  Without such an outside point of reference, it is 
impossible to give meaning to the language they hear or read.  Ricks, supra note 
146, at 785 (citing WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 152, ¶ 258). 
     Where two parties have a dispute over the proper usage of a term, there is no 
way to decide between the two parties’ positions without some reference to an 
outside independent standard of usage.  Without some independent “criterion 
for correctness,” there is no basis for preferring one party’s usage over another’s. 
 165. Hacker Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/hacker (last visited Sept. 28, 2012). 
 166. See id. 
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meaning and the parties are both companies in the computer 
programming industry?  In order to educate the judge 
regarding the additional common convention for usage, each 
of the parties should be allowed to submit evidence of a public 
usage outside the definition set forth in the dictionary.  This 
is where extrinsic evidence of usage, such as trade usage, 
comes in. 
Once the judge establishes the range of public usages, the 
judge can then determine which public usage is appropriate 
to the particular contract in question.  Often, this is quite 
easy within the four corners of the contract itself.  If a 
computer programming company enters into a contract with a 
temp agency that specializes in computer programmers, it is 
clear that the appropriate custom of usage is that common to 
computer programmers.  The definition of “hacker” as “a 
person who uses a computer to gain unauthorized access to 
data” would not be a public usage among computer 
programmers and thus would not be the basis for that term’s 
meaning. 
This example raises an important issue that would 
require courts to expand evidence of public usage to include 
evidence that a party belongs to a particular group that 
employs the particular usage when the contract itself does not 
suggest the appropriate usage group.  Using the above 
example, a party relying upon trade usage to define a term 
would have to show not just that an alternative public usage 
exists, but also that the party is part of a group that employs 
the particular trade usage.  For the extrinsic evidence of 
usage to be relevant, the party would have to show that the 
particular usage purported is a common usage in the group to 
which that party belongs.  It would make little sense for a 
court to consider extrinsic evidence of what a word means in 
British English if neither party is British or resides in 
Britain.  Such biographical information regarding the parties 
is not evidence of the parties’ intent, but instead is evidence 
that the usage purported by a party is relevant. 
2. Course of Dealing and Course of Performance 
Unlike evidence of public meaning, which is grounded in 
the very conventions that give words their ability to 
communicate meaning, evidence of parties’ prior conduct is 
very difficult to associate with a limited range of meanings or 
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intentions.  As discussed below, any particular act or series of 
actions is very frequently compatible with numerous 
contradictory purported intentions on the part of the actor.  
The meaning of a phrase that parties agree to be bound by, 
put into writing, and sign their names to, can be bounded in a 
way that the meaning underlying a party’s actions cannot. 
i. Course of Dealing and Course of Performance Are 
Not Determinative of Meaning 
Evidence of the parties’ course of performance and course 
of dealing is problematic, not only because it is evidence of 
subjective intent, which cannot be what gives words their 
meaning when people communicate, but also because such 
evidence is frequently compatible with multiple subjective 
intentions.  Courts that rely upon such evidence look at 
parties’ course of dealing and course of performance in order 
to determine what the parties intended, and by this 
determination of what the parties intended, such courts 
define what the contract means. 
But a party’s actions in performing a contract are often 
compatible with numerous contradictory intentions, and thus 
cannot provide a basis for meaning.  Take the following 
simplified example: If I order halibut, but the waiter instead 
returns with beef, and neither I nor the waiter object, and 
then I pay the amount listed next to the word “halibut” (or 
the amount next to the word “beef” for that matter), it is by 
no means clear that the waiter and I meant or understood the 
terms “halibut” and/or “beef” in the same way.  I could have 
simply had in mind that by uttering the word “halibut” I 
would receive something to eat, or I could have understood 
that I would receive a dark sanguineous meat as opposed to a 
white flaky meat—and so also for the waiter’s understanding.  
This same transaction could happen a dozen times in exactly 
the same way, and there still would be no way of knowing 
what exactly either of us meant or understood. 
But let us say that the thirteenth time I order halibut, 
and the waiter returns with the same dark sanguineous meat 
as the last twelve times, I object and say “this is not halibut, 
this is beef and I will not pay for it.”  On what basis could I 
say that I am right or I am wrong other than by virtue of 
conventions of public meaning outside of the course of dealing 
between me and the waiter?  As described above, there is no 
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way to tell what I meant each of the twelve previous times I 
ordered halibut, or even that I meant to distinguish between 
light flaky meat and a dark sanguineous meat each time I 
ordered.  Nor is there any way to tell what the waiter 
understood me to mean.  The only way to make such a 
judgment is by reference to some outside standard of public 
meaning, which cannot be logically derived from the parties’ 
course of dealing.  As discussed above, one cannot assume 
that the waiter and I have merely swapped the general usage 
of the term “halibut” with the general usage of the term “beef” 
since our conduct is consistent with numerous other 
intentions. 
One might think “well this is silly, clearly you meant 
‘beef’ when you said ‘halibut.’  Sure, it is possible that you 
meant ‘something to eat,’ but that certainly is not what any 
reasonable observer would possibly think you meant.”  The 
problem with this criticism is that one’s intuition that I must 
have simply meant “beef” when I said “halibut” is itself based 
upon common conventions of usage.  In this case, the 
convention is: “when one orders from a menu one is asking for 
a particular thing, not just something to eat.”  This is not 
something that is baked into the word “halibut” but is 
something that is imported into the word based upon 
conventions of use.  One cannot save the notion that meaning 
is grounded in the intent of the speaker (or the hearer) 
without reference to public customs and conventions for how 
words are used. 
ii. Course of Dealing, Course of Performance, and 
Accidental Terms 
When parties enter into a contract, they agree to be 
bound by the terms set forth in the contract.  But when 
parties act a certain way, either over the course of several 
contracts or in the course of performing a single contract, 
parties are not necessarily intending to create the terms of 
the contract to which they agreed to be bound.  For example, 
say I enter into a contract with a tenant that calls for $1000 
rent at the beginning of each month.  But say that for eight 
months, those payments are made anywhere from the first of 
the month through the fourteenth of the month.  In such a 
case, under the context rule, evidence of the parties’ course of 
performance could be used to show that what the parties 
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really meant, and therefore what the contract means, is that 
payments could be made up to two weeks into the month. 
This is problematic because, as discussed above, the fact 
that the payments were up to two weeks late and nobody 
objected is consistent with multiple intentions regarding the 
language of the contract.  I might accept these payments, 
which I consider late, not because I in fact intended the 
contract to mean that payment must be made within two 
weeks of the first of every month, but merely because I do not 
yet wish to go to the trouble of litigating the issue.  I might 
also merely be cutting the other party slack because I 
understand that they are in financial difficulty, but have no 
intention of waiving my right to declare a breach at any point 
(a right I have always maintained I have). 
If the court entertains evidence of my accepting late 
payments (course of performance) as an objective 
manifestation of my intent, the court is very possibly reading 
an intent that I never in fact had into the meaning of the 
language of the contract.  If evidence of course of performance 
is admissible in the first instance to determine the meaning of 
a contract, and if I am not careful, I could end up 
inadvertently altering the meaning that courts will assign to 
the contract. 
Not only does this seem to undermine the very endeavor 
that courts claim to be pursuing—discerning the intent of the 
parties—but it can also lead to increased transaction costs as 
parties are forced to carefully monitor their conduct so as not 
to create extrinsic evidence that will be used to give contracts 
meaning that the acting party may never have intended. 
As discussed below, there is certainly a place for evidence 
of the parties’ course of performance and course of dealing, 
but there is not a place for that in the interpretation of what 
the parties’ contract means.  Rather, there are circumstances 
where our legal system privileges notions of fairness over 
what contracts actually say.  And it is in those types of cases 
that evidence of the parties’ course of performance and course 
of dealing should be admitted. 
By tying meaning to public conventions of usage, rather 
than some notion of absolute meaning, the proposal in this 
Article takes the notion of plain meaning off its platonic 
pedestal and puts it back into the earthly realm of 
convention.  Many of the problems with formalist concepts 
GOLDSTEIN FINAL 7/1/2013  2:07 PM 
120 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53 
such as plain meaning stem from the fact that those formalist 
concepts claim to be describing some objective underlying 
reality, when in fact, they are vehicles for incorporating 
conventions.  Those conventions may have within them 
notions that, upon reflection, appear to be unjust or unfair.  
Examples of this include the concerns raised by Professor 
Solan and the discussion above regarding consumer contracts 
of adhesion.167
iii. An Alternative Explanation for the Intuitive 
Appeal of Course of Dealing and Course of 
Performance 
  But a view of contract meaning that treats 
meaning not as absolute but as conventional, will allow courts 
to more readily put conventions regarding meaning aside and 
focus on equity where our moral intuitions call for it.  Or at 
least, the proposal in this Article will force courts to make a 
choice between the ideals of predictability and fairness 
explicit. 
There is something intuitively appealing about evidence 
of what the parties have done in prior agreements and how 
they have carried out the contract over which they currently 
have a dispute.  One explanation for this intuitive appeal is 
that such evidence reflects what the parties actually meant 
by the words of their contract, as compared to what they 
merely said or wrote.  Actions speak louder than words.  But 
as discussed above, there are numerous situations where 
parties’ course of dealing or course of performance may not 
reflect their intent regarding what their contract means. 
I suspect, rather, that the intuitive appeal of such 
extrinsic evidence is bound up with commonly held notions of 
fairness, more particularly embodied in equitable concepts 
such as detrimental reliance.  The application of such 
concepts has little to do with enforcing the commercial 
expectations of the parties based upon the words they put 
into writing, and thus has little to do with making the law of 
contracts more predictable.  Rather, such equitable concepts 
are intuitively appealing because we as a society are willing 
to give up a certain degree of certainty that our contract will 
be enforced as written in return for a degree of fairness.  For 
example, parties who lead others to believe that there will be 
 
 167. Solan, supra note 51, at 90, 106–14. 
GOLDSTEIN FINAL 7/1/2013  2:07 PM 
2013] THE PUBLIC MEANING RULE 121 
no consequences for a breach should not be allowed to claim a 
breach and collect damages, regardless of what the contract 
says. 
Indeed, many jurisdictions explicitly look to course of 
performance as evidence supporting a claim for estoppel or 
waiver, as opposed to evidence of what contract terms mean.  
This use of course of performance evidence in support of a 
defense against the terms of a contract illustrates the point 
that course of performance and course of dealing are 
intuitively appealing as a basis for disregarding a contract, 
not for interpreting it.  As the court in PC Com, Inc. v. 
Proteon, Inc. explained, “parties can generally change a 
contract by a modifying agreement, by a course of 
performance, or by estoppel.”168  Here, the court all but makes 
explicit the notion that course of performance is not evidence 
of what the parties’ contract means, but is evidence that the 
court should disregard the contract’s meaning on equitable 
grounds.169  The court also addresses the doctrine of waiver by 
course of performance, which is an even more explicit use of 
course of performance to nullify a contractual provision on 
equitable grounds.170  Waiver, by definition, is a claim that a 
party has abandoned a contractual right.171  A waiver defense 
asserts that evidence of course of performance should be used 
to directly contradict the language of the contract, not to 
interpret it. 172
Similar equitable notions also explain the intuitive 
appeal of other forms of extrinsic evidence typically 
associated with the intent of the parties, such as evidence of a 
prior or collateral agreement.  As discussed above, Professor 
Solan gives the example of a particular kind of promissory 
note transaction where one company convinces another to 
sign a promissory note for outstanding amounts due, payable 
on demand, but orally promises not to execute for a particular 
 
 
 168. PC Com, Inc. v. Proteon, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 1125, 1130 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) 
(emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 169. See id. 
 170. Id. at 1133. 
 171. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1717 (9th ed. 2009). 
 172. See, e.g., Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Atlas Minerals, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 
1162, 1175 (C.D. Ill. 1997) (“As far as the termination date is concerned, the 
contract was neither ambiguous nor incomplete.  Thus, course of performance is 
only relevant to the extent it is evidence of a waiver.” (citation omitted)), aff’d, 
146 F.3d 448 (7th Cir. 1998). 
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period of time.173  Professor Solan notes that under a strict 
plain meaning rule, the prior oral promise is not 
enforceable.174
B. Why the Public Meaning Rule Better Reflects the Purpose 
of Contracts 
  But again, this has little to do with what the 
terms of a promissory note “payable upon demand” mean.  
Common English usage is not equivocal that such language 
means that the creditor can foreclose the debt any time she 
chooses.  The extrinsic evidence of a prior agreement has 
nothing to do with what the parties’ contract means but 
instead has everything to do with fairness.  It would be unfair 
to allow a party to induce another to sign an agreement based 
upon a promise and then renege on that promise. 
People use language for a multitude of reasons.  They use 
language to state facts and inform (“You have a stain on your 
shirt.”).  They use language to perform actions (“I declare 
war.”  “The meeting is adjourned.”  “I offer. . . . I accept.”).  
They use metaphors to convey subtle abstract notions (“Juliet 
is the sun.”175  “Now is the winter of our discontent.”176
Why do people use language to enter into contracts?  
While there may be numerous ancillary reasons, the primary 
purpose of a contract is to control a future state of affairs by 
invoking the coercive power of the state.  Put another way, 
people enter into contracts to ensure that other people will do 
particular things at or by a particular time.  The explanation 
for why this must be so has to do with the role that promises 
backed by coercive force play in coordinating human activity. 
). 
Take, for example, the project of building a home.  Now it 
is theoretically possible for me to build a structure without 
relying upon promises backed by coercive force.  I could go to 
a Home Depot and buy the lumber, nails, drywall, plumbing 
materials, electrical materials, etc., paying cash on the spot 
(for purposes of this example, I will even allow an instant 
exchange of money for stuff not to count as a contract).  I 
could then buy the required excavating machines and go 
about building the structure all by myself.  This would 
presuppose a vast amount of construction experience, which I 
 
 173. Solan, supra note 51, at 112–13. 
 174. Id. at 113. 
 175. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 2, sc. 2. 
 176. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, RICHARD III act 1, sc.1. 
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would have somehow obtained without any promise to pay for 
it.  The house I could so construct would certainly be a 
meager affair, and even this meager affair would rely upon a 
background of contractual interactions that allow for 
storefronts such as a Home Depot to exist in the first place. 
But compare this to what I can do with access to a 
mechanism for guarantying (or at least making it very likely) 
that others will perform some of these tasks for me at a 
certain time.  I could ensure that materials will be delivered 
to the construction site at or by a particular date so they will 
not be exposed to the elements, or at the very least, so I would 
not have to make constant trips to a building supply store.  I 
can have teams of individuals perform coordinated tasks 
simultaneously, motivated by my legally enforceable promise 
to pay them.  Each of these individuals could be a specialist in 
a particular of field of construction, such as a plumber, an 
electrician, or a roofer—each of whom could perform greater 
and more complicated tasks than a generalist ever could.  
Thus, through the power of contracts, I could build a mansion 
rather than the shack discussed above.  All of this is based 
upon my ability to enter into an agreement backed by the 
coercive power of the state, which will predictably influence 
the actions of others.177
Without contracts backed by the coercive power of the 
state, or some other method of predictably controlling the 
future actions of another, coordinated human activity is 
impossible.  Thus, the purpose of contracts—their raison 
d’être—is at a minimum the ability to control another party’s 
future activities, and thereby control a future state of affairs.  
People might use the form of a contract for other purposes, 
but such other purposes are not the primary purpose that 
contracts serve in society. 
 
The role that contracts play in society is a contextual fact 
that governs the meaning of the language of a contract, and 
that militates against the interpretation of contracts in 
 
 177. Of course, contracts are not the only kinds of promises backed by 
coercive force.  I could take out a high interest loan from a well-organized family 
business that might be backed by other types of coercive force involving the 
future application of a baseball bat to my kneecaps.  Even social pressures may 
act as a form of coercive force.  The moral notion that lying or reneging on one’s 
promises is wrong is another type of coercive force attended with consequences 
ranging from social ostracization to my inability to enter into such agreements 
in the future. 
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idiosyncratic ways, i.e., based upon the subjective 
understanding of a party.  A contract is not merely a 
communication between the parties since it must, at the end 
of the day, be capable of being implemented by a court.  It is a 
fair assumption that the parties to contracts know this; that 
their audience—the parties to whom they are 
communicating—must ultimately include the court if a 
contract is to serve its function.  This fact rules out the 
idiosyncratic use of language by a rational party.  It would be 
irrational to use a word or phrase in a non-standard, private 
way.  A rational party will not knowingly say one thing and 
mean another because a court will have much more direct 
access to public and shared conventions regarding the 
meaning of what was said or written, as opposed to what the 
speaker or writer subjectively meant.  A rational party will 
not jest in a contract given the risk that the court will not get 
the joke.  This presumption makes the possibility that parties 
will use words or phrases in idiosyncratic or novel ways far 
less of a concern. 
The purpose that contracts serve—creating a predictable 
future state of affairs—is an essential part of the context by 
which the language in a contract must be interpreted.  The 
notion that the words in a contract cannot be understood 
outside of the context of all the extrinsic evidence is highly 
questionable given the reasons that parties enter into 
contracts in the first place.  Parties to contracts are 
attempting to reduce their agreement to writing in a manner 
that can be effectively implemented by a court, and parties 
will therefore write their contracts so as to achieve that goal.  
More importantly, as discussed above, if courts look to 
sources of meaning that are not public and shared, and/or not 
within the parties’ control, courts undermine this critical 
ability to utilize contracts to predictably constrain another 
party’s behavior, and undermine society’s ability to engage in 
coordinated activity generally.  When courts interpret 
contract language outside of the public, shared, and 
conventional usage of language, they unmoor language from 
the very shared conventions that make communication 
possible, and thereby make it impossible for parties to rely 
upon those shared conventions to predictably bind each 
other’s behavior.  As discussed above, parties have far less 
control over the kinds of extrinsic evidence that courts look to 
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in order to determine the parties’ subjective intent. 
C. The Public Meaning Rule and Procedural Legitimacy 
The rules governing the admissibility of extrinsic 
evidence, as with the rules governing contract interpretation 
generally, should be judged not only by the extent to which 
they foster predictability and fairness, but also to the extent 
they foster a sense of legitimacy among those subject to such 
rules.  While it is certainly true that a system of rules that 
fosters predictability and fair outcomes is more likely to be 
seen as legitimate, there is something to be said about 
whether a system of contract interpretation itself appears 
logical and reasonable rather than strained and legalistic.  
The perceived reasonableness of the process itself matters, 
not just the outcomes. 
As Professors Schwartz and Scott have argued, how 
contracting parties expect the court to interpret their 
contracts matters.  “[T]he issue is not what interpretive style 
is best calculated to yield the correct answer.  Rather, the 
issue is what interpretive style would typical parties want 
courts to use when attempting to find the correct answer.”178  
Schwartz and Scott argue that business parties will prefer 
judicial interpretations based upon the text of the contract 
alone because the costs of drafting and litigating such 
contracts will be lower, even if a textualist interpretive 
scheme is less effective at determining the intent of the 
parties.179
But it is not just the cost of litigation that drives parties 
to prefer the language they have chosen.  Parties are likely to 
prefer the language they have chosen because they have 
chosen it (as opposed to extrinsic evidence of the parties’ 
words or acts, which the parties have not chosen to be part of 
their contract).  Rules of a game seem inherently fairer when 
those rules are agreed to by the players rather than imposed 
by the arbiter after the fact.
 
180
 
 178. Schwartz & Scott, Contract Theory, supra note 1, at 569. 
  As discussed in Part IV.A.2.ii, 
 179. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux, 119 
YALE L.J. 926, 930 (2010) [hereinafter Schwartz & Scott, Interpretation Redux]. 
 180. This point is illustrated by the court’s reasoning in Hunt Foods, 
discussed above.  See supra Part IV.A.1.  In that case, the court’s search for the 
parties’ subjective intent ignored the parties’ explicit and intentional decision to 
put the option to purchase in writing without condition.  The parties in Hunt 
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parties do not choose their course of performance or their 
course of dealing in the same way that they choose the 
language of their contracts.  Choosing the language of a 
contract is an explicit choice regarding the thing that will be 
used to decide a future dispute.  A party’s actions outside of 
the contract do not necessarily represent decisions about how 
a potential dispute ought to be resolved.  The written terms of 
a negotiated contract181
Furthermore, when courts apply canons of interpretation 
or rules for the consideration of extrinsic evidence that lead to 
interpretations that greatly diverge from common sense and 
typical experience, courts lose their legitimacy as reasoned 
arbiters.  Aside from the purely consequentialist arguments 
in this Article, the public meaning rule is better tied to 
contracting parties’ legitimate expectations of both how 
courts will view their contracts and how they will determine 
what the words in the contract mean.  Restricting parties to 
evidence of public usage bounds the interpretation of words to 
those meanings that words in fact have borne, and prevents 
courts from considering and applying extrinsic evidence that 
would give words purely idiosyncratic meanings. 
 are far less likely to be accidental 
than terms implied through conduct, which as discussed in 
Part IV, is very frequently compatible with multiple 
intentions. 
D. The Public Meaning Rule and Other Problems: Fairness 
and Ambiguity 
1. Evidence of Intent and Equitable Claims and 
Defenses 
This Article posits that courts should only consider 
extrinsic evidence of public conventions of usage, not extrinsic 
 
Foods did not accidently exclude the condition at issue.  Rather, they each 
knowingly agreed to be bound by an option contract that did not contain a 
condition on the exercise of the option.  Thus courts applying the context rule 
often ignore or at least undervalue the most relevant evidence of what exactly 
the parties agreed to be bound by—i.e., the language that the parties have 
chosen to include in (and chosen to exclude from) their written contract. 
 181. Again, this concept of a contract as rules for dispute resolution which 
the parties have agreed to does not apply well, if at all, to consumer contracts of 
adhesion, where it is questionable whether the consumer can be said to have 
chosen the terms at all.  This is yet another reason for limiting the public 
meaning rule to negotiated contracts. 
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evidence of subjective intent, when determining the meaning 
of terms within a contract.  However, courts should consider 
other types of extrinsic evidence when considering equitable 
claims and defenses.  In these situations, extrinsic evidence of 
what we would normally consider the parties’ intent may be 
highly relevant to such considerations of fairness.  But courts 
should be clear that what they are doing in such cases is 
determining what would be a fair resolution of the parties’ 
dispute based upon various notions of equity—not enforcing 
the parties contract.  In such cases, courts are not 
determining what the language in a contract means, and by 
allowing such equitable defenses, our legal system trades 
some predictability for fairness. 
As discussed above, contracts give a party the private 
right to constrain both her and another’s behavior.182  It is 
this ability to constrain another’s behavior that makes 
contracts a useful tool for creating predictability.  You and I 
agree that if I do X, you will do Y.  We set that agreement 
down in writing using terms that a third party will be able to 
understand and enforce.  When a court decides what is fair as 
opposed to what the words of the contract mean, the courts 
are no longer enforcing the constraints the parties agreed to, 
and the predictability creating function of the contract is 
undermined.  Parties also have far less access to where, 
when, and how courts will apply principles of fairness in 
determining how a contract ought to be enforced or not.  One 
need only briefly consult the formulations of such equitable 
doctrines to see that such doctrines undermine predictability.  
For example, a defense based upon unconscionability is 
available essentially where contract terms are “really 
unfair.”183
 
 182. See supra Part IV.B. 
 
 183. See Zuver v. Airtouch Commc’ns, Inc., 103 P.3d 753, 759 (Wash. 2004) 
(en banc) (“ ‘Shocking to the conscience’, ‘monstrously harsh’, and ‘exceedingly 
calloused’ are terms sometimes used to define substantive unconscionability.’ ”  
(quoting Nelson v. McGoldrick, 896 P.2d 1258, 1262 (Wash. 1995) (en banc))); 
Vasquez-Lopez v. Beneficial Or., Inc., 152 P.3d 940, 948 (Or. Ct. App. 2007) 
(“The primary focus . . . appears to be relatively clear: substantial disparity in 
bargaining power, combined with terms that are unreasonably favorable to the 
party with the greater power may result in a contract or contractual provision 
being unconscionable.  Unconscionability may involve deception, compulsion, or 
lack of genuine consent, although usually not to the extent that would justify 
rescission under the principles applicable to that remedy.  The substantive 
fairness of the challenged terms is always an essential issue.” (quoting Carey v. 
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This is by no means a bad thing.  But it is a tradeoff 
between predictability and fairness that courts and jurists 
should recognize and make explicit.  Just as formalism trades 
equity in the individual case for predictability from case to 
case, equitable claims and defenses trade some predictability 
from case to case for fairness in each particular case.  When 
courts look to extrinsic evidence other than public usage, they 
trade predictability for fairness. 
Even courts that apply a strict plain meaning rule 
regarding extrinsic evidence are willing to make this trade 
and allow parties to submit extrinsic evidence to show that no 
contract was formed in the first place—even where the 
contract appears facially unambiguous.  Courts applying the 
plain meaning rule allow extrinsic evidence to prove defenses 
such as unconscionability or fraud.  Even under a centuries-
old formulation of the plain meaning rule, a party was 
allowed to escape liability by showing that she entered into 
the contract by fraud or mistake.  As early as the 14th 
century, an illiterate party who placed his seal upon a 
document could escape liability by testifying that the 
document was incorrectly read to him.184  By 1892, courts 
were applying the caveat that extrinsic evidence, while 
generally inadmissible, may be considered if a party alleges 
fraud or mistake.185
Equitable claims and defenses provide a judicial safety 
valve for cases where it would be simply too unfair to
 
 enforce 
the terms of a contract.  For example, because the terms are 
just too one sided, because one party was tricked into the 
agreement, because one
 
Lincoln Loan Co., 125 P.3d 814, 828 (Or. Ct. App. 2005))). 
 of the parties made an 
understandable error, or any of the other numerous bases for 
claims in equity.  While this Article does not provide an 
argument for exactly what equitable claims and defenses the 
courts ought to recognize, or what the contours of those 
claims and defenses ought to be, the existence of equitable 
claims and defenses addresses one of the most frequent 
 184. WIGMORE, supra note 64, § 2405, at 15 (“That a man who could not read 
had sealed a document which had been incorrectly read over to him, was 
recognized, before the 1400s, as sufficient to relieve him from liability.”). 
 185. E.g., Staver v. Rogers, 28 P. 906, 907 (1892) (holding that extrinsic 
evidence is inadmissible “without an allegation in the pleadings that such 
contract was in fact signed by the party making such allegations by mistake or 
fraud, or without full knowledge of the conditions thereof.”). 
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criticisms of contract rules that limit extrinsic evidence—that 
such formalist rules produce legalistic and unfair results. 
i. Equitable Doctrines Are a Better Fit for 
Equitable/Normative Concerns 
Courts should apply equitable doctrines, rather than 
interpretive doctrines, to address issues of fairness not only 
because it is more judicially honest, but also because 
equitable doctrines were created and have developed for the 
very purpose of addressing our notions of what is fair.  In 
contrast, the canons of contract interpretation must 
necessarily be concerned with other considerations, such as 
predictability and enforcing the constraints the parties 
bargained for, and are thus less effective tools for 
implementing our notions of fairness. 
As discussed above in Part IV, evidence of a party’s 
course of performance can be used to give a contract term 
meaning which that party never intended.  This flies in the 
face of what contract interpretation is purportedly about—
enforcing the deal that the parties actually made.  But the 
equitable defense of estoppel, as compared to contract 
interpretation, is not concerned at all with the agreement the 
parties reached.  Quite the opposite, estoppel (reasonable 
reliance) is grounds for disregarding the parties’ agreement 
because it would be unfair to enforce it.  Estoppel has as its 
primary element, the very thing that makes it unfair to 
enforce such a contract—that is reasonable reliance upon the 
other party’s words or acts.  Estoppel, in other words, is 
grounded in the very notions of fairness that give evidence of 
course of performance and course of dealing its intuitive 
appeal. 
Similarly, equitable claims for unjust enrichment and 
quantum meruit are a much better fit for our intuitions of 
fairness than are the rules of contract interpretation.  Courts 
have described the elements of unjust enrichment as: (1) 
whether the plaintiff conferred a benefit upon the defendant, 
(2) whether the defendant was aware of the benefit, and (3) 
whether it would be unjust for the defendant to retain the 
benefit.186
 
 186. Volt Servs. Grp v. Adecco Emp’t Servs. Inc., 35 P.3d 329, 337 (Or. Ct. 
App. 2001). 
  Again, baked into the elements of such an 
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equitable claim are the very notions of fairness that often 
cause extrinsic evidence of the parties’ actions to tug our 
sense of fairness.  Rather than using extrinsic evidence as a 
shoehorn to make the language of a contract fit within 
society’s sense of fairness, equitable doctrines such as unjust 
enrichment allow the court to simply decide what is fair 
based upon elements of proof that track our criteria for 
fairness. 
ii. Equitable Doctrines as a Back Door to Evidence 
of Subjective Intent? 
Does the existence of equitable claims and defenses 
amount to a simple back door which will effectively allow in 
extrinsic evidence regardless of the rigor with which the 
public meaning rule is enforced?  There is good reason to 
think not.  With all respect to Professor Gilmore, the 
equitable exceptions have not killed contracts.  These 
equitable exceptions do not, in fact, swallow the rule.  Fraud 
and mistake must be proven by clear and convincing 
evidence.187  Waiver must be shown by words or conduct 
unequivocally evincing an intent to waive a known right.188  A 
party claiming estoppel must prove reasonable reliance upon 
the words or conduct of the party.189  A party claiming 
unconscionability must show that the terms of the contract 
“shock the conscience.”190
 
 187. Vasquez-Lopez, 152 P.3d at 955 (“[A] party asserting fraud must prove 
by clear and convincing evidence not only that it relied on the other party’s 
misrepresentation, but that the reliance was reasonable under the 
circumstances.”); Moyer v. Ramseyer, 359 P.2d 407, 411 (Or. 1961) (“If the 
contract had been entered into by mutual mistake, reformation to accommodate 
the true understanding of the parties might have been available.”); id. at 412 
(“[E]vidence of equities which justify such extraordinary relief as well as 
evidence to prove the agreement really intended must be clear and 
unequivocal.”).  
  These are not easy standards to 
meet.  Nor do these equitable doctrines merely raise the bar.  
 188. See, e.g., Schmeck v. Bogatay, 485 P.2d 1095, 1099 (Or. 1971) (“[S]ince 
waiver must be manifested in some unequivocal manner and requires an intent 
to relinquish a known right.  In this case, on the contrary, plaintiffs’ conduct 
was not an “unequivocal” construction of the lease to the effect claimed by 
defendant . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
 189. See Puziss v. Geddes, 771 P.2d 1028, 1030 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) 
(“Detrimental reliance is a required element of estoppel.” (citation omitted)). 
 190. Fransmart, L.L.C. v. Freshii Dev., L.L.C., 768 F.Supp.2d 851, 870–71 
(E.D. Va. 2011) (“The substantive terms of the contract must be so grossly 
inequitable that it ‘shocks the conscience.’ ”  (citation omitted)). 
GOLDSTEIN FINAL 7/1/2013  2:07 PM 
2013] THE PUBLIC MEANING RULE 131 
Rather, they change the very nature of what a party must 
prove. 
These heightened standards within these equitable 
doctrines also provide a firewall against the types of extrinsic 
evidence that can mislead courts.191
The public meaning rule proposed by this Article thus 
has practical consequences and is not simply a way of 
reconceptualizing existing rules of contract interpretation.  As 
an example, evidence of internal communications (such as 
board meeting minutes) relating to what one party 
understands a term to mean would be admissible under the 
context rule, but not admissible under the proposed public 
meaning rule, even if a party raised an equitable defense such 
as estoppel or waiver. 
  By requiring parties to 
prove fraud and mistake by clear and convincing evidence, 
these equitable defenses counterbalance the unreliability of 
memory and the incentive to lie with a higher threshold of 
evidence. 
For example, in Denny’s Restaurants, Inc. v. Security 
Union Title Insurance Co., a Washington court applying the 
context rule looked to an internal memorandum of one of the 
parties when interpreting the language of the parties’ 
contract.192  The proponent of this evidence argued that, 
under the context rule that had recently been adopted in 
Washington,193 an internal memorandum may be admissible 
as evidence of that party’s intent regarding what the terms of 
the contract mean.194  The court agreed, holding that the 
memorandum was clear evidence of what the parties 
intended.195
Under the rule proposed in this Article, such evidence 
would not have been admissible, either as evidence of the 
 
 
 191. See supra Part III.A. 
 192. Denny’s Rests., Inc. v. Sec. Union Title Ins. Co., 859 P.2d 619, 630 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1993). 
 193. Id. at 623 (“In order to interpret the original meaning of a contract term, 
extrinsic evidence is admissible, even if the term appears unambiguous.”) (citing 
Berg v. Hudesman, 801 P.2d 222, 230 (Wash. 1990)). 
 194. Id. (“Denny’s argues that under Berg, evidence of industry practice and 
Security Union’s own internal memoranda should be admissible to demonstrate 
the parties’ true intent that the policy was purchased to cover questions of off-
record encroachment and boundary.”). 
 195. Id. at 627 (“Security Union’s own internal memoranda clearly suggest 
that extended policies are intended to insure questions of off-record 
encroachment and boundary.”). 
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parties’ intent, or as evidence in support of an equitable claim 
such as estoppel or waiver.  Because the memorandum was 
not communicated to the other party, it could not give rise to 
detrimental reliance, nor could it evince an intent to waive a 
known right.196
iii. The Canons of Interpretation and Equity 
Masquerading as Interpretation 
 
This Article argues for a strict separation between 
contract interpretation and equitable/normative 
considerations.  Courts should be clear and keep separate 
when they are determining what the words in a contract 
mean and when they are deciding what is fair between the 
parties.  One place where equitable/normative considerations 
can creep into a court’s contract interpretation is through the 
canons of contract construction. 
For example, the restatement exhorts courts to give 
contracts “an interpretation which gives a reasonable, lawful, 
and effective meaning” to its terms.197  As scholars have 
recognized, one possible explanation for this cannon is that 
parties would not waste their time making a contract that is 
unlawful and invalid.198  However, this explanation is 
incomplete at best.199  As Professor Zamir notes, this canon is 
not a sincere attempt to affect the parties’ intentions, rather 
it is an attempt to “ ‘push’ contracts away from the domain of 
unenforceability”.200  Likewise, the notion of reasonableness 
in this canon of interpretation is intimately connected with 
equitable notions such as “good faith, fairness, and justice.”201
 
 
 
 196. If an internal memorandum shows that one party was in fact trying to 
dupe the other, it could give rise to a fraud claim, in which case the internal 
memorandum would be admissible.  See, e.g., McEvoy Travel Bureau, Inc. v. 
Norton Co., 563 N.E.2d 188, 193 (Mass. 1990) (explaining that the statement by 
a party to contract that it did not intend to enforce contractual termination 
provision could form basis for fraud claim, to extent that statement 
misrepresented actual intent of the speaker as evidenced by internal 
memoranda).  But internal memoranda that merely suggest how one party 
interpreted the contract would not be admissible under the rule proposed in this 
article. 
 197. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203(a) (1979). 
 198. Zamir, supra note 1, at 1722. 
 199. Id.  
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at 1722–23 (footnotes omitted). 
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Professor Zamir argues that the plain meaning rule does 
not reflect what courts actually do, which is look to equitable 
principles when deciding what contracts mean in the first 
instance—i.e., they manipulate the canons of construction to 
interpret the contract in a manner that is fair rather than in 
a manner that reflects the conventional meaning of the 
language in the contract.202
This Article, however, argues that equitable principles 
(such as reasonableness) should not be conflated with 
interpretation.  As argued above, a scheme of contract 
interpretation that replaces the common and public meaning 
of language with notions of reasonableness/equity both 
undermines parties’ expectations regarding how courts will 
interpret their agreements and undermines the very reason 
why parties enter into contracts—that is to bind each other’s 
future behavior in a manner that is predictable and 
commercially useful.  Furthermore, as argued in Part IV in 
particular, equitable doctrines are better vehicles for 
achieving equity than are maxims of contract interpretation. 
 
iv. Limiting the Proposed Rule to Negotiated 
Commercial Contracts 
As discussed above, rules that exclude extrinsic evidence 
tend to be problematic in consumer contracts of adhesion, but 
less so in regard to negotiated commercial contracts.  
Contracts that are created by a party in a position of superior 
sophistication and power and offered to a less sophisticated, 
less powerful party on a take it or leave it basis tend to favor 
the abuse of superior power and sophistication.  In such 
cases, the plain meaning of the contract can become a fig leaf 
for self-conscious attempts to get parties to agree to terms 
that, if properly explained, they never would have agreed to.  
Indeed, Professor Zamir makes this very point in arguing for 
an inverted hierarchy of contract interpretation, which begins 
with notions of fairness at the initial phase of contract 
interpretation, explaining that “[i]n the case of detailed 
standard-form contracts, customers frequently do not bother 
to read most of the provisions of the form. . . .”203
 
 202. Id. at 1722. 
 
 203. Id. at 1771.  Professor Zamir goes much further and argues that in most 
contracts parties generally fail to say what they mean and that a rule that looks 
to notions of reasonableness over the language of the contract is more likely to 
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The problem with consumer contracts of adhesion, 
however, is one of equity and not one of meaning.  As such, 
fine print is problematic because people do not read it, not 
because it lacks meaning.  But the dangers associated with 
excluding extrinsic evidence associated with fairness is so 
great in cases involving consumer contracts of adhesion, that 
it may be best to allow in all such extrinsic evidence at the 
outset. 
Implementing this distinction between negotiated 
commercial contracts and other types of contracts is less 
problematic than it might first appear.  There are already 
specialized bodies of law that apply to various types of 
contracts, such as secured transactions, negotiable 
instruments, and sales of goods.204
‘Merchant’ means a person that deals in goods of the kind 
or otherwise holds itself out by occupation as having 
knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods 
involved in the transaction or to which the knowledge or 
skill may be attributed by the person’s employment of an 
agent or broker or other intermediary that holds itself out 
by occupation as having the knowledge or skill.
  In particular, Article 2 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code includes special provisions 
that apply to contracts involving merchants: 
205
 
 
 
conform to the parties’ actual intent.  (“[I]f it is true that typically there is a gap 
between the words of the formal contract and the actual understandings and 
intentions of the parties—a claim sustained by empirical findings—then the 
interpreter’s concentration on the formal contract may actually frustrate the 
goal of realizing these intentions and understandings. . . . It should be stressed 
that, although this conclusion is particularly applicable to standard-form 
contracts and consumer transactions, it is by no means restricted to these 
categories.”).  Id. at 1773.  The frequency with which parties fail to say what 
they mean, however, is not necessarily a basis for imbuing the process of 
contract interpretation with notions of reasonableness and fairness.  First, as 
discussed elsewhere in this Article, the existence of equitable claims and 
defenses allows courts to apply notions of fairness and justice without bending 
the words that parties have chosen to fit that goal.  And, as discussed in Part 
IV.D.1.i., these equitable doctrines are a better fit for our notions of fairness 
since these equitable doctrines were created to track commonly held notions of 
fairness.  Second, even if only a minority of parties actually make the effort to 
say what they mean (which is itself a controversial proposition), the law should 
not disadvantage parties that do, in fact, attempt to say what they mean when 
concerns over equity can be dealt with separately through equitable doctrines 
tailor made to address such concerns. 
 204. See, e.g., U.C.C. Arts. 2, 3, 9. 
 205. U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (2003). 
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A very similar provision could be used to determine when 
the rule proposed in this Article ought to be applied.  
Specifically, negotiated commercial contracts could be defined 
as “negotiated contracts between persons or entities that deal 
in goods or services of the kind, as either buyers or sellers.”  
Such a broad, abstract rule certainly has much play in its 
joints, but courts have managed to apply the definition of 
“merchant” under the U.C.C. in an intelligible way. 
In fact, courts have applied the concept of contracts 
between merchants in a manner that is similar to that which 
is suggested in this Article.  In K & M Joint Venture v. Smith 
International, Inc., the court applied the notion of a contract 
between merchants to include not only parties with 
“specialized knowledge as to the goods” being transacted, but 
also parties with “specialized knowledge as to business 
practices” within the relevant industry.206  The contract at 
issue in K & M was between a company that sold machines 
for boring tunnels and a joint venture that was formed for the 
purpose of bidding on a sewer project for the City of 
Cleveland.207  The court noted that while the joint venture 
was not a merchant in the sense of one who sells the 
particular goods in question, “one of the joint venturers, had 
excavated eight tunnels using boring machines before the 
joint venture was formed.”208  Accordingly, the court held that 
the joint venture should be held to the stricter standards 
applied to merchants under the U.C.C.209
One might argue that a less restrictive rule for extrinsic 
evidence regarding consumer contracts of adhesion will 
undermine predictability for such contracts.  But for such 
contracts, stare decisis will provide the predictability that is 
otherwise missing under the context rule.  Commercial 
contracts of adhesion almost always involve boiler plate 
language that is reused in numerous form contracts that are 
entered into again and again.  When the same paragraph is 
entered into over and over again between a commercial entity 
and its customers, and a court renders a judgment regarding 
that paragraph, the court’s ruling will apply broadly to all of 
 
 
 206. K & M Joint Venture v. Smith Int’l, Inc., 669 F.2d 1106, 1115 (6th Cir. 
1982). 
 207. Id. at 1108. 
 208. Id. at 1115. 
 209. Id. 
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the contracts containing that paragraph.  Thus, where a court 
decides the effect of a form contract, even in equity, its ruling 
will have force in later cases involving the same language.210
2. Conflicting Usage and Ambiguity 
  
This simply is not possible for non-standard contracts, which 
differ from case to case. 
As explained above, the rule proposed in this Article 
would allow extrinsic evidence where there are two or more 
common usages of a term.  This extrinsic evidence would be 
limited to biographical evidence submitted by each party to 
show that the common usage it propounds is relevant to the 
parties, e.g., evidence that a term has a particular usage 
among computer programmers and evidence that the party 
propounding that usage is a computer programmer.  In fact, 
courts may be able to determine the relevant usage from 
biographical information within the contract itself, such as 
the fact that the parties are computer programmers. 
But there will be cases where courts cannot determine a 
single relevant usage based upon the text of the contract and 
evidence of how the words of the text are properly used in 
language. 
Such ambiguity can arise in at least two ways.  First, the 
parties may have no relevant public usages in common.  
Second, a term may have two conflicting public usages, each 
of which is relevant to both of the parties.  In the first case, 
parties would be limited to equitable remedies under the rule 
proposed in this Article since there would be no way to assign 
a single meaning to the contract.  In the second case, the 
court would have to look to extrinsic evidence of the activity 
the parties were engaged in at the time of contracting to 
determine which of multiple relevant public usages applies. 
i. Irreconcilable Conflicting Usages 
There will be cases where there is no common usage 
applicable to both contracting parties.  In such a case, the 
language of the contract is irreconcilably ambiguous and 
cannot be assigned a single meaning, much as if the parties 
 
 210. See Michael Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A 
Generation Later, 31 J. CORP. L. 779, 793 (2006) (“As a legal rule or charter term 
is interpreted and applied in a variety of settings, however, the term acquires 
more content, and uncertainty regarding its application declines.”). 
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agreed to a word that has one meaning in German and one 
meaning in English, and neither party spoke the other’s 
language.  Both parties are right in the sense that both have 
properly used the language.  But the parties literally did not 
say the same thing. 
A good example of this would be in contracts between 
speakers of the same language but from different countries 
where the same word has two different common usages.  For 
example, if an American company enters into a contract with 
a British company to purchase 100 beakers, the American 
company will almost certainly expect to get 100 flat-bottomed 
vessels with a lip commonly used as a laboratory container,211 
while the British company will likely provide the American 
company with 100 handle-less drinking cups.212
As explained above, courts ought to (and often do) settle 
such cases based upon equitable notions, such as whether one 
party had reason to know the common usage employed by the 
other.  Even if neither party has such reason to know, courts 
should (and often do) apply remedies to equitably distribute 
the burden of the ambiguity. 
  In such a 
case, the term “beaker” as used in this example has no single 
meaning applicable to both of the parties and the contract is 
irreconcilably ambiguous. 
The famous case Raffles v. Wichelhaus typifies yet 
another form of ambiguity that courts need to address.213  In 
this case, two parties entered into a contract for the sale of 
cotton arriving by ship from India.214  According to the 
contract, the cotton was to be delivered by the ship “Peerless,” 
however two ships of that name sailed from Bombay roughly 
one month apart.215  The seller and the promised cotton were 
aboard the second “Peerless” and after the first ship arrived 
without the promised cotton, the buyer filed for breach of 
contract.216 
 
 211. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 190 (Philip Babcock 
Gove et al. eds., Merriam-Webster, Inc. 1993). 
While the majority ruled that the existence of two ships 
named “Peerless” was not a defense to liability, courts have 
 212. THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 726 (James A.H. Murray et al., eds., 
Oxford University Press 1933). 
 213. Raffles v. Wichelhaus (1864) 159 Eng. Rep. 375. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
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subsequently adopted the dissent’s view that a party may 
present extrinsic evidence of a latent ambiguity to show that 
the parties differed in their understanding of the contract.217 
The Raffles case and others like it, however, are better 
understood as mutual mistakes of fact rather than true 
ambiguity.  Such supposed “latent ambiguity” cases involve 
terms that unambiguously indicate that the world is one way, 
when in fact the world is another way.  In the Raffles case, 
the parties’ contract indicated that there would be one ship 
named “Peerless” sailing from Bombay, when in fact, there 
were two.218  In this way, the notion of latent ambiguity is 
really a mutual mistake of fact by the parties. 
The court’s role in such a case is to determine a fair 
resolution, not to determine what the word “Peerless” means.  
ii. Multiple Relevant Usages 
In such a case, the court cannot determine who ought to 
suffer the consequences of the parties’ mistake based upon 
the meaning of the language within the contract, but the 
court still has to pick a winner and a loser, or at least divide 
the costs associated with the parties’ mistake.  A ruling that 
the parties failed to reach an agreement and, that the 
contract is therefore not enforceable, merely declares that the 
parties’ contractual duties of performance are excused by 
default. 
In other cases, there may be two or more meanings 
relevant to both parties.  In such cases, the court should 
admit further evidence regarding the activity the parties were 
engaged in when they drafted the contract.  This is not 
evidence of the public and conventional meaning of language, 
but neither is it evidence of the parties’ intent. 
This concept is demonstrated by the following 
hypothetical.  Imagine that two parties enter into a written 
contract where “Party A agrees to deliver the bag marked X 
to the bank in return for $10.”  Both of these parties speak 
English where the word “bank” can be used to mean “a place 
 
 217. Id. (“There is nothing on the face of the contract to show that any 
particular ship called the ‘Peerless’ was meant; but the moment it appears that 
two ships called the Peerless were about to sail from Bombay there is a latent 
ambiguity, and parol evidence may be given for the purpose of showing that the 
defendant meant one ‘Peerless’ and the plaintiff another.”) 
 218. Id. 
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where money is stored” or “the side of a river.”  Based upon 
the language of the contract alone, this contract could call for 
Party A to deliver the bag to a place that stores money, or to 
the side of a river.  Extrinsic evidence of the activity the 
parties were engaged in, such as evidence that the bag was 
obviously full of money (as opposed to say fishing tackle) 
would be necessary to resolve the ambiguity.  Such evidence 
is not evidence of intent, nor is it evidence of the possible 
relevant usages of the text of the contract. 
This resort to such extrinsic evidence to resolve such an 
ambiguity is no different from what courts do under both the 
plain meaning rule and the context rule, where the full range 
of extrinsic evidence is relevant to resolve a facial ambiguity, 
so long as it does not contradict the language of a contract.  
Translated into the language of the public meaning rule, even 
in the case of an ambiguity, such extrinsic evidence could not 
be used to support a usage that is not relevant to either party.  
In the above example, the parties could not submit extrinsic 
evidence that they understood the word “bank” to mean a 
restaurant if there is no evidence that either party belongs to 
a language group that uses the word “bank” in that way. 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND AREAS FOR FURTHER 
SCHOLARSHIP 
The observations in this Article regarding the problems 
with both the plain meaning and the context rule suggest a 
new rule for when and what kinds of extrinsic evidence courts 
ought to consider.  Courts should admit extrinsic evidence 
regarding how a term is publically and conventionally used in 
language, but exclude extrinsic evidence of the parties’ 
subjective intent, when determining what the terms in a 
contract mean.  Evidence typically associated with the 
parties’ intent may be relevant to various equitable defenses 
and equitable claims.  But here, courts are not interpreting 
the contract, they are doing equity.  Courts should make this 
attendant tradeoff between predictability and fairness 
explicit. 
Both the plain meaning rule and the context rule are 
problematic, albeit in different ways. 
As discussed above, parties enter into contracts in order 
to predictably control other parties’ behavior—i.e., to ensure 
that another party will perform (or not perform) a certain act 
GOLDSTEIN FINAL 7/1/2013  2:07 PM 
140 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53 
at a certain time.  This ability to control, or at least 
predictably influence, another party’s behavior is what makes 
a contract a useful tool for coordinating human activity.  
When courts fail to interpret a contract in a manner 
consistent with the public and conventional meaning of words 
and phrases, courts undermine this crucial ability to 
predictably influence another party’s behavior, and thus 
undermine an essential purpose that contracts serve. 
While this Article has focused primarily upon the 
categories of extrinsic evidence that courts should or should 
not consider, it also reflects a broader rehabilitation of 
formalist conventions within the law of contracts.  This 
Article is a microcosm of the larger notion that while formal 
legal doctrines may not constitute absolute objective truths, 
the law cannot operate without shared and commonly obeyed 
formal doctrines that give the law structure and foster 
predictability.  Our particular legal conventions may be 
historically contingent, but a system of laws cannot operate 
without a coherent system of publically shared conventions, 
even if they are cobbled together through trial and error.  
Formal rules, in both contract law and in communication, are 
necessary for either endeavor to succeed. 219
As any second year law student will attest, strict 
formalism is dead.  Law schools no longer teach the law as a 
series of objectively true legal principles that can be deduced 
from the case law and then applied mechanically to any 
particular set of facts to arrive at the proper result.  That war 
is over and the legal realists have won.  This is particularly 
true for the law of contracts where the notion that words in a 
contract can have an absolute and objective plain meaning 
has been thoroughly debunked.
 
220
But even in this demystified world that the legal realists 
have made, the bones of legal formalism still stand as the 
structure upon which the law clings and grows.  The various 
fact-intensive and fuzzy equitable doctrines that choked the 
life from the formalist enterprises of Langdell and Williston 
are still applied within a framework of formalist concepts.  It 
 
 
 219. See Scott, supra note 50, at 851 n.11 (“[T]he ‘new formalism’ rejects the 
categorical imperative to deduce rules from first principles that characterized 
classical formalism as practiced by the late-19th-century Langdellians.”). 
 220. See Ricks, supra note 146, at 768 (“The fashion in American law schools 
is to teach that contract language cannot have a plain meaning.”). 
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is impossible to discuss the law of contracts without such 
formalist concepts as offer, acceptance, and consideration, 
and these formal doctrines are still applied alongside their 
equitable counterparts.  These formalist concepts are not true 
in some platonic sense.  But whether or not “Contract, like 
God, is dead,”221 we all continue to quote its formalist 
scripture.  Courts continue to invoke the preexisting duty rule 
and 
Simply because we realize that our legal rules are 
conventions rather than absolute truths does not mean that 
we should, or even can, discard them completely.  Our 
common law and the society it serves needs these formalist 
conventions in order to function lest the jurisprudence of 
commercial exchange collapse into an unpredictable tangle of 
pure equity.  The rule of law entails the existence of laws and 
rules for their application.  To rid the law of all its formality 
would reduce our legal system to unstructured pleas at the 
foot of a monarch—whose notions of justice and fairness 
might change from case to case.  Laws, by definition, are 
meant to apply to a range of factual situations across time.  
Inevitably, rules have Procrustean consequences.  But the 
stretching and chopping of facts to fit within a finite number 
of legal principles is a necessary sacrifice if our legal system 
is to have any uniformity and predictability and if we at all 
care about the notion of consistent treatment before the law. 
the doctrine of illusory promises, even as they recognize 
claims for unjust enrichment and promissory estoppel. 
 
 221. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 1 (Ronald K.L. Collins ed., 
Ohio State University Press 1995) (1974). 
People need conventions in order to communicate, 
regardless of whether those conventions reflect some sort of 
absolute meaning, or merely an implicit and reflexive 
agreement within a society to use language in a certain way.  
Contract interpretation is simply a special case of this same 
principle.  We cannot do away with formalist conventions, 
such as rules limiting extrinsic evidence, without reducing 
the law of contracts to pure questions of equity, the outcomes 
of which are difficult to predict, and therefore, not conducive 
to stable commerce.  The way courts go about interpreting 
contracts should reflect this need for conventions while at the 
same time recognizing that such conventions are not 
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necessarily true in an absolute sense.  Shared conventions of 
one sort or another are required for language to have 
meaning, for commerce to occur, and for the law of contracts 
to function. 
While this Article provides a framework for the types of 
extrinsic evidence that courts ought to consider when 
interpreting a facially unambiguous contract, and then goes 
through several examples, it does not provide an exhaustive 
analysis of exactly what sorts of extrinsic evidence constitute 
evidence of the conventional and public use of words and 
phrases as opposed to extrinsic evidence of the parties’ 
subjective intent.  While this Article argues that the line 
between interpretation and equity should be clearly drawn, it 
does not propose an argument for exactly where that line 
should fall.  In future articles, I intend to provide an 
exhaustive analysis of where various other particular kinds of 
extrinsic evidence would fall under the public meaning rule.  
In addition, I intend to argue for where exactly the line 
between interpretation and equity should be drawn, in 
particular, by critically assessing the elements of the various 
equitable claims and defenses in light of the particular 
notions of fairness that animate them. 
 
